An Exploration of Impact:  Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy by Todman, Will et al.
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Syria Studies   
––––––––––––––   
  
VOL 9, NO 1 (2017)   
April 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii    An Exploration of Impact: Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
An Exploration of Impact: 
 Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy 
_______________________  
  
Will Todman 
Özlem Özdemir &  Emrah Özdemir  
Rahaf Aldoughli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Syria Studies   iii 
 
 
Syria Studies   
An open-access, peer reviewed, & 
indexed journal published online by:   
The Centre for Syrian Studies (CSS)  
University of St Andrews  
  
Raymond Hinnebusch (Editor-In-Chief) 
Omar Imady (Managing Editor) 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv    An Exploration of Impact: Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy 
 
 
Contents  
  
Preface 
Omar Imady                            v-vi  
 
Isolating Dissent, Punishing the Masses: Siege Warfare as 
Counter-Insurgency 
Will Todman                                             1-32  
 
Whose Problem Is It Anyway? The Depiction of Syrian Refugee 
Influx in Political Cartoons 
Özlem Özdemir &  Emrah Özdemir       33-24  
 
Interrogating the Construction of Gendered Identity in the Syr-
ian Nationalist Narrative: Al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi 
Rahaf Aldoughli                      64-120 
 
Our Authors               121  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Syria Studies   v 
 
 
Preface 
Omar Imady 
 
In the first issue of Syria Studies to be published in 2017, we are 
pleased to share three studies that provide important insights on 
subjects that have gained significant importance in recent times 
in so far as how they relate to the Syrian context:  siege warfare, 
political cartoons, and gender politics. 
In Isolating Dissent, Punishing the Masses: Siege Warfare 
as Counter-Insurgency, Will Todman analyses the intricate 
relationship between the nature of the Syrian regime and the 
military tactics it opted to use to suppress those opposed to it, 
both during the insurgency phase, and the subsequent civil war. 
Sieges were effective because they allowed the regime to make 
optimal use of its military advantage. Once you have a segment 
of the population in a restricted area, you not only control food 
and medical supplies, but you can also unleash an indiscriminate 
bombardment campaign, as the regime indeed did. Todman 
provides a historic context to the use of these tactics by the 
Syrian regime (i.e. Hama), and addresses the important question 
of whether or not siege warfare helped the regime survive. 
In Whose Problem Is It Anyway? The Depiction of Syrian 
Refugee Influx in Political Cartoons, Özlem Özdemir and Emrah 
Özdemir explore the way in which the crisis of Syrian refugees 
was depicted by cartoons that appeared in Western media. In fo-
cusing on twelve randomly selected political cartoons, the au-
thors tell a story of suffering that begins with why the refugee is 
fleeing and ends with how the refugee is being received by both 
border countries and beyond.  The use of political science and 
communication theory to analyse these cartoons is not common 
in the current literature and constitutes an important contribu-
tion. 
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In Interrogating the Construction of Gendered Identity in 
the Syrian Nationalist Narrative: Al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi, 
Rahaf Aldoughli sheds an important light on how early Bathist 
theoreticians planted the intellectual foundation for the way in 
which gender roles were to be understood and, subsequently, 
taught and applied in Baathist Syria. Using extensive quotes 
from original sources, Aldoughli documents the systematic mas-
culinisation of conceptions of nationhood by Baathist theoreti-
cians. Perhaps most significant was the “normalisation of 
militarism in the national narrative” which, resulted in perpetu-
ating “a hierarchy that obstructs the elimination of the gender 
gap in the Syrian constitution and legislation.” 
The important common denominator between the above 
noted studies is ‘impact’; more specifically, the extent to which 
a specific method or idea achieved its desired impact. Todman 
explores the impact of siege warfare and concludes that despite 
the fact that the war economy allowed for besieged populations 
to receive a level of relief, sieges were overall successful in that 
they allowed for the regime to make use of its military advantage 
and survive a dire challenge to its very existence. While Özdemir 
and Özdemir showed that political cartoons can indeed be used 
to better understand a specific phenomenon, they equally 
demonstrated that political cartoons are ultimately expressive of 
a specific mindset that the majority of a population has at any 
given moment in time, rather than instruments by which public 
perceptions can be significantly changed. Indeed, the plight of 
Syrian refugees was not impacted in any significant way by the 
cartoons examined here. Finally, Aldoughli explores the impact 
of Baathist ideology on the way in which gender conceptions and 
roles were manifested in Baathist Syria. Here, impact is easily 
discerned. The works of early Baathist theoreticians, systemati-
cally and deliberately, became the ideological underpinnings of 
a society that is dominated by the idea of a militarized nation in 
which men lead both the state and the family. 
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Isolating Dissent, Punishing the Masses: 
Siege Warfare as Counter-Insurgency 
 
Will Todman 
 
This paper argues that the Syrian regime’s authoritarian nature 
has affected the choice of the siege as a tactic of counter-insur-
gency. The first section traces the evolution of urban locales as 
sites for the practice of war, and explores the geographies of 
counter-insurgency tactics, the justification for collective pun-
ishment, and the concept of ‘urbicide’. The tactics employed by 
the Syrian regime are examined in light of the history of counter-
insurgency and urban warfare in Syria in the twentieth century. 
The evolution of the Syrian regime’s military doctrine is ex-
plored in order to show how it came to include siege tactics, 
which were first deployed in Hama in 1982 when Hafez al-Assad 
quashed the Islamist rebellion. Finally, the paper explores the 
imposition of sieges since April 2011, looking at how various 
armed groups employed sieges to achieve their military objec-
tives. Two area case studies are given to illustrate the differences 
in military tactics between urban and rural sieges - the sieges of 
Yarmouk Camp and the Eastern Ghouta. The paper shows how 
siege tactics allowed the Syrian regime to isolate and contain 
sources of rebellion, and prevent them from spreading to key ar-
eas of strategic importance. Thus, siege tactics were one of the 
factors that contributed to the Syrian regime’s ability to survive 
during the current conflict, even when various analysts predicted 
its imminent fall. 
 
Introduction 
In December, 2016, convoys of green buses carried tens of thou-
sands of civilians and opposition fighters out of the remaining 
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rebel-held areas of Aleppo. The regime’s brutal campaign to re-
take Aleppo mirrored the tactics it used two years earlier to re-
capture the city of Homs, once considered the capital of the 
Syrian revolution. In both instances, suffocating sieges forced 
the opposition forces to submit.  
 A siege is enforced by erecting checkpoints at strategic ac-
cess points to a target area, thereby taking control of the area’s 
supply-lines. Its primary aim is to force a restive population into 
submission by cutting off its access to food and other goods in-
dispensable to its survival.  
 On April 25, 2011, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) deployed 
its first siege in the current conflict. After seven weeks of unrest, 
the SAA surrounded and laid siege to the southern city of Dera’a 
as part of a ten-day military operation that would leave over 500 
Syrians dead, and 2,500 detained.1 Following this initial use of 
siege tactics, the regime then began imposing longer-term partial 
sieges in rural Damascus in 2012, limiting the entry and exit of 
civilians and goods. The first instance of opposition forces be-
sieging a pro-government area came in July 2012 when fighters 
from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) surrounded Nubul and Zahraa, 
two Alawi-majority towns in rural Aleppo. In the spring of 2013, 
the regime intensified its sieges in rural Damascus, preventing 
all goods from reaching many areas, and subjecting the besieged 
populations to aerial bombardment and shelling.2  
 In November 2016, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ste-
phen O’Brien, estimated that 974,080 people were living under 
siege in Syria, nearly doubling the estimate from six months ear-
lier.3 This revised figure brought the estimate closer to that of 
the monitoring group, Siege Watch, which has long argued that 
over a million Syrians live under siege.4  Opposition armed 
groups, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), impose 
sieges that trap many thousands of Syrians. The vast majority, 
however, live under siege of the regime. 
 This paper will examine why the Syrian regime adopted 
sieges by exploring the urbanisation of modern warfare and 
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counter-insurgency. Beyond the relevant academic literature, the 
research draws upon interviews with 21 diplomatic and human-
itarian officials, as well as survey responses completed by 16 in-
habitants of various besieged areas in Syria, collected from 
Beirut during the summer of 2015. The identities and affiliations 
of these individuals are not included to ensure their confidenti-
ality and safety.  
 Arguing that Syria’s status as an authoritarian state affects 
the choice of counter-insurgency tactics, the first section will 
trace the evolution of urban locales as sites for the practice of 
war, and explore the geographies of counter-insurgency tactics, 
the justification of collective punishment, and the concept of 
‘urbicide’.5 The second section will examine the tactics em-
ployed by the Syrian regime during the current conflict in light 
of the history of counter-insurgency and urban warfare in Syria 
in the twentieth century. The evolution of the Syrian regime’s 
military doctrine is explored in order to show how it came to 
include siege tactics, first deployed in Hama in 1982 when Hafez 
al-Assad quashed the Islamist rebellion. The final section of the 
paper will explore the imposition of sieges since April 2011, 
looking at how armed groups employed siege warfare to achieve 
their military objectives. I will illustrate the differences in mili-
tary tactics between urban and rural sieges by looking at the 
sieges of Yarmouk Camp in Damascus, and the Eastern Ghouta 
in rural Damascus. This paper will explain how adopting siege 
tactics allowed the Syrian regime to isolate and contain sources 
of rebellion and prevent them from spreading to key areas of 
strategic importance. Thus, siege tactics were one of the factors 
that contributed to the Syrian regime’s ability to survive during 
the current conflict, even when various analysts predicted its im-
minent fall. 
 
Counter-insurgency and the changing location of war  
The Syrian regime’s tactics were a crucial element of its ability 
to survive even as it suffered from increasing military defections, 
dwindling finances, and growing international condemnation. I 
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propose that the regime considered the early stages of the con-
flict to be a counter-insurgency, and this explains various ele-
ments of its response to the uprising, including the use of siege 
tactics. When sieges were first imposed on restive areas of the 
country, the asymmetric military capabilities of the conflicting 
parties, and the guerrilla tactics the rebels employed, both cor-
roborate this point of view. An insurgency is defined in modern 
times as:  
[A]n organized movement that aims at overthrowing the 
political order within a given territory, using a combina-
tion of subversion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and propa-
ganda.6 
Counter-insurgency, then, refers to the tactics that a government 
or occupying power employs to put down an insurgency. Laleh 
Khalili provides a useful differentiation between “enemy-cen-
tric” and “population-centric” counter-insurgency tactics.7 Pop-
ulation-centric counter-insurgency involves attempts by the 
government or occupying power to provide security, protection, 
and services to populations living in the areas wherein insurgents 
operate. Enemy-centric counter-insurgency, on the other hand, 
aims to undermine insurgents’ support by imposing punitive 
measures on the entire population living in insurgents’ zones of 
operation, be they militants or civilians. Examining the impact 
of regime type on choice of counter-insurgency tactics, David 
Ucko argues that authoritarian regimes are more likely to adopt 
brutal enemy-centric tactics in a way that “punishes the people 
for the insurgency and severs the bonds between the two not 
through politics but with force.”8 Authoritarian regimes are able 
to adopt such methods because they are not constrained by law, 
are uncontested by rivals, and can often control the flow of in-
formation available to their citizens through the state-owned 
press.9 Thus, for an authoritarian regime, the focus of counter-
insurgency is not on winning ‘hearts and minds’, but rather on 
“selling the threat to the broader populace, surging support for 
both party and state, and whipping up a chauvinistic hatred for 
the perfidious rebels that justifies whatever response is deemed 
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necessary.”10 This paper will focus on these facets of enemy-
centric counter-insurgency tactics, which the Syrian regime has 
overwhelmingly favoured during the current conflict.  
 
The emergence of modern urban warfare 
The dramatic rate of global urbanisation over the last few centu-
ries has had a profound effect on the nature and setting of war-
fare. Throughout history, while the city has remained the critical 
site of militarized power and control, the site of armed conflicts 
has shifted.11 In pre-modern and early-modern times, cities were 
both the primary agents and targets of war, and great efforts were 
expended on sacking and capturing cities of strategic im-
portance, often by employing sieges.12 The European nation-
states that emerged during the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries directed the violence, control, and repression of colonial 
conquest from cities, however the cities themselves were no 
longer the primary site of conflict. Instead, colonial expansion-
ism transferred the site of violence to rural areas as colonial 
states quashed rural insurrections in order to exploit the land to 
sustain the cities. However, with the coming of the industrial 
age, cities became crucial vehicles for providing states with suf-
ficient manpower and military technology to sustain massive 
wars. As a result, once again, cities became the target of state-
led armed conflict, with bombing campaigns moving from the 
“selective destruction of key sites within cities” to “attacks on 
urban areas” in their entirety.13 
 Twentieth-century urbanisation coincided with major 
global developments including increasing social polarization 
and inequality, violent political and economic structural adjust-
ments, the heightening salience of ethnic and fundamentalist re-
ligious identities, and the growing scarcity of many essential 
resources.14 This rapid urbanisation brought these new tensions 
into the urban sphere and resulted in an “implosion of global and 
national politics into the urban world.”15 As a result, many of the 
conflicts arising from these tensions have occurred in urban 
spaces, and thus, bloody urban insurgencies have proliferated. 
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The geographies of counter-insurgency 
Insurgencies create new spatial possibilities for violence. Unlike 
the conventional warfare of the past, insurgencies are not con-
strained by linear movement, but rather operate indeterminably, 
exploiting the ability to exist in multiple spatial and temporal 
points in a seemingly random manner.16 This unpredictability 
has proven an effective means of subverting a state’s traditional 
authority, and helps explain why insurgency-tactics have arisen 
so frequently in recent history. To combat these new geographic 
vulnerabilities, counter-insurgencies often seek to reshape space 
as a way of re-exerting their authority.  
 During the French occupation of Syria, the French Troupes 
du Levant were forced to alter their military tactics in response 
to rebel insurgency. French forces traditionally used military 
column formations to march through areas and command the 
obedience of native populations. As the rebels exploited the new 
spatial opportunities insurgency-tactics afforded them, attacking 
the French sporadically and then swiftly retreating, the occupy-
ing forces attempted to reshape Syria’s physical geography in 
such a way as to restore their military advantage over rebel 
groups.17 As would be the case once again nearly a century later, 
one of the most important insurgencies operated in the Ghouta, 
the rural farmlands surrounding Damascus, after rebel groups 
failed to take the Syrian capital in October 1925. The Troupes 
du Levant’s military columns were ineffective in quashing the 
insurgents there, as the rebel groups could flee oncoming col-
umns, hide in the rural landscape, and then re-form to strike in a 
non-linear, random fashion.18 Initially unable to encircle such a 
wide area, the French employed an ‘inverted siege’ on Damascus 
to ensure that the rebels couldn’t enter the city.19 This tactic in-
volved the construction of 12 miles of new boulevards and 
barbed wire fences around the capital.20 After the landscape had 
been altered to ensure that the rebels could not penetrate the city, 
the French positioned some 9,000 troops around the Ghouta and 
swept through, forcing the rebel groups out to the North. This 
method of restricting movement to deal with insurgency in the 
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rural Ghouta, as we shall see, shares parallels with how the Syr-
ian regime has attempted to quash rebellion in that region during 
the current conflict.  
 In urban settings too, counter-insurgency operations seek to 
reshape space to their advantage, and this often includes con-
structing physical barriers, such as walls. Geographical parti-
tions often have the effect of solidifying boundaries between 
different population categories, be they ethnicities, communi-
ties, or nations.21 Walls have been constructed as a tactic of 
counter-insurgency in many modern conflicts including in 
Northern Ireland, by the U.S. army in Iraq, and by Israel in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. The new spatial realities that 
emerge enable increased military control by curtailing the envi-
ronments in which rebels can operate. These new geographies 
have the effect of turning entire populations of urban spaces into 
objects of “study, warfare, and manipulation” as the traditional 
separation between military and civilian targets is blurred.22 To 
justify this, armed actors employ Manichaean, dichotomised 
rhetorical constructions of ‘us’ and an othered ‘them’, in a way 
that renders all human subjects living in an urban environment 
legitimate targets, being seen as real or potential fighters, terror-
ists, or insurgents.23 Sieges also aim to curtail the space in which 
insurgents can operate, affecting entire populations, and the Syr-
ian regime has employed rhetoric to justify such tactics. 
 
Counter-insurgency and collective punishment 
Many aspects of this new military doctrine of counter-insur-
gency equate to collective punishment. Although collective pun-
ishment was historically accepted as a necessary element of 
warfare, the 1899 Hague Conventions broke this tradition and 
forbade collective punishment, stating: “[n]o general penalty, 
pecuniary or otherwise, can be inflicted upon the population on 
account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be re-
garded as jointly and severally responsible”.24 The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions expanded upon these provisions, stating that “[n]o 
protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has 
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not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all 
measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”25  
 However, despite these provisions, governments and occu-
pying powers have frequently employed measures which equate 
to collective punishment. Unable to locate insurgents responsi-
ble for hostile acts, powers have used collective punishment in 
an attempt to reduce violence and enforce obedience.26 Histori-
cally, collective punishment included preventing food and other 
supplies from reaching a restive area. In Malaya, British colonial 
forces prevented the sale of anything but precooked rice to vil-
lages believed to be harbouring insurgents. Field Marshal Gerald 
Templer even ordered a reduction of rice rations as a punitive 
measure, following certain insurgent attacks.27 More recently, 
throughout Operation Vigilant Resolve during the U.S. occupa-
tion of Iraq in 2004, U.S. forces allowed just three of sixty vehi-
cles carrying relief supplies, food, and medicine into Fallujah as 
part of their counter-insurgency operations.28 This blockade was 
designed to force an end to the support of insurgents by down-
grading the living conditions of all of the city’s inhabitants. In 
2015, a UN OCHA study asserted that the Israeli and Egyptian 
blockade on the Gaza Strip had undermined the living conditions 
of its 2 million inhabitants, saying “[the] restrictions have re-
duced access to livelihoods, essential services, and housing, dis-
rupted family life, and undermined the people’s hopes for a 
secure and prosperous future.”29  
 Given technological advances in the modern day, govern-
ments and occupying powers have increasingly sought to destroy 
the means of modern urban life in a systematic manner, a tactic 
known as ‘urbicide’. Employed as a facet of counter-insurgency, 
urbicide targets the modern infrastructure upon which urban 
populations rely, including systems of electricity, communica-
tions, water, sanitation, and transportation.30 Tactics of urbicide 
aim to render a city uninhabitable, forcing the residents into sub-
mission by turning daily life into a “massive struggle against 
darkness, cold, immobility, hunger, isolation, fear of crime and 
violence, and a catastrophic and rapid degeneration in public 
Syria Studies   9 
health.”31 Other forms of urbicide reshape the physical geogra-
phy of a city to assert the complete dominance of a power over 
its enemy.  
 War mobilizes a charged dialectic of attachment to place: 
the idea that ‘our’ places are the antithesis of those of the de-
monized enemy.32 In counter-insurgencies, therefore, the very 
physicality of cities is also rendered a legitimate target of vio-
lence, wherein entire neighbourhoods are razed to the ground in 
retaliation for having harboured insurgents. Given that tactics of 
urbicide do not discriminate between armed fighters and civil-
ians, they constitute a form of collective punishment.  
 The 1982 Hama uprising provides one of the first examples 
of institutionalized urbicide, in which Hafez al-Assad used urbi-
cide as a tactic of counter-insurgency. Following the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s calls for Hama’s population to rise up against As-
sad’s regime in 1982, the regime carefully employed rhetoric in 
a way that would mobilize society for a brutal campaign of coun-
ter-insurgency. Patrick Seale described Hafez al-Assad as hav-
ing turned from a recluse into an orator “able to set large 
audiences alight and to do so night after night” with his fiery 
speeches.33 Two divisions of the SAA, the 3rd Armoured Divi-
sion under the command of General Shafiq Fayyad, and the De-
fence Brigades under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, joined 
forces to quash the rebellion. These loyal divisions were joined 
by pro-regime paramilitary forces which had been carefully re-
cruited and armed by the regime.34 Rifaat al-Assad employed 
rhetoric that was consistent with collective punishment, stating 
“those who are not with the regime must now be considered 
against it.”35  
The assault began with several days of street battles, but af-
ter this proved insufficient, a high-intensity siege was imposed, 
and indiscriminate shelling destroyed whole neighbourhoods of 
the city.36 Following this assault, army bulldozers were sent to 
flatten the smoking shells of buildings, allowing ground troops 
to advance, but also wiping the sites of rebellion from Hama’s 
geography.37 Tens of thousands of the city’s fleeing inhabitants 
10    An Exploration of Impact: Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy 
were arrested at the security ring the regime forces had im-
posed.38 Estimates of the dead range from 10,000 to 40,000.39  
 
Syrian military doctrine 
Understanding why and how such brutal measures of counter-
insurgency entered into the SAA’s military doctrine, as exempli-
fied in Hama, is key to explaining the use of sieges in the current 
conflict. Following the defeat of Arab armies in the Six-Day War 
of 1967, the Soviet Union took the opportunity to dramatically 
increase its military relations with various Arab armies, includ-
ing with the SAA. As part of this process, Soviet military advi-
sors were placed in every Syrian military training facility, air and 
naval base, maintenance depot, and even in every single squad-
ron of the SAA.40 The SAA also sent significant numbers of its 
officers to the Soviet Union for military training.41 To a greater 
extent than other Arab countries with military relationships with 
the Soviet Union, the Syrian military adopted the Red Army’s 
organisation, tactics and operations.42  
 The Soviet Union adopted siege tactics resembling those 
employed in rural areas of Syria today when fighting Ukrainian 
separatists in the 1940s and 1950s, establishing outposts and 
checkpoints on all the roads and trails that connected villages 
thought to be harbouring insurgents, thus cutting off their access 
to provisions and critical supplies.43 However, until the occupa-
tion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviet Union had little experi-
ence in counter-insurgency, and had not developed a nuanced 
military doctrine capable of responding to such threats.44 As a 
result, the Soviet Union relied on a tactic in Afghanistan that had 
previously proven successful, and which exploited an advantage 
it maintained over mujahedeen – overpowering military force 
through its superior artillery.45 In Herat, a city central to urban 
guerrillas, the Soviets engaged in such extensive shelling that 
three-quarters of the urban centre was reduced to rubble.46 Rifaat 
al-Assad, one of the key commanders in the Hama offensive, 
trained at the Soviet Yekaterinberg Artillery Academy, and it 
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was there that he likely learned such tactics. Thus, it seems prob-
able that the tactic adopted by the SAA of overwhelmingly rely-
ing upon tank artillery fire in the operations against the 
insurgents in Hama was a product of Soviet military doctrine.47 
Russia has honed its doctrine of counter-insurgency through its 
involvement in other conflicts. During the second Chechnyan 
war in the late 1990s, the Russian military combined the heavy 
bombardment that had characterised many of its previous mili-
tary operations with a military and economic blockade designed 
to choke any external support.48   The military relationship 
between Russia and Syria so evident today has a long history. 
Given that reports of Russian military advisors embedded with 
the SAA surfaced early in the current conflict, it seems probable 
that Russian military doctrine has had an impact on the tactics 
employed in recent years by the SAA.49 However, it is also im-
portant to remember that many of the same Syrian military of-
ficers who played a role in the 1982 Hama offensive retain roles 
in the SAA today. While Rifaat al-Assad and Shafiq Fayyad 
were respectively exiled from Syria and retired from the SAA in 
1995, younger officers who participated in the Hama offensive 
remain in the SAA.50  
 In the intervening period between the Syrian regime’s bru-
tal crackdown in 1982, and March 2011, opponents of the gov-
ernment suffered from torture, detention, and long prison 
sentences, but the regime has not attempted military operations 
of the same scale.51 This implies that the Syrian military’s tactics 
of quashing rebellion in Hama were highly successful, and so it 
is logical that the regime would look to siege tactics as a proven 
means of putting down rebellion. Having witnessed the toppling 
of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and Egyptian 
president Hosni Mubarak, the Syrian regime’s response was also 
based on the premise that they did not repress the popular pro-
tests quickly enough. The following section will explore how 
and why the Syrian regime employed tactics of counter-insur-
gency during the current conflict. 
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The use of sieges in the current conflict 
During the early stages of the uprising that erupted in Dera’a in 
March 2011, the Syrian regime employed rhetoric in a manner 
typical of Ucko’s model of authoritarian counter-insurgency. In 
his national address on 30th March 2011, President Bashar al-
Assad argued that Syria was “facing a great conspiracy” at the 
hands of “imperial forces” who were supported by foreigners 
and media groups.52 This rhetoric reflects the established tactic 
of counter-insurgency, to create divisions between those ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ of the nation.53 Until late March 2011, all protests 
were depicted as a “decisive threat”.54 However, in subsequent 
speeches in early April, as it became clear that the protests were 
not dying down, and due to external pressure, Assad changed 
tack and proposed limited political reforms, acknowledging the 
presence of some protestors with legitimate demands.55 When 
this too failed to quell the protests, once again Assad differenti-
ated between groups of people. In a speech at Damascus Univer-
sity on June 20, 2011, he argued that there were three different 
categories of people involved in the unrest in his country: those 
with legitimate concerns; outlaws; and takfiri extremists who 
tried to “sneak into Syria”. This rhetoric represented another at-
tempt to paint all dissenters as foreigners or criminals, distin-
guishing between ‘Syrians’ and “saboteurs”.56  
 Military operations conducted by Syrian authorities to 
quash the growing insurgency mirrored the broad dichotomy be-
tween those who were with the regime and those who were 
against it, and whole geographical areas were categorised as be-
ing one or the other, making no attempt to distinguish between 
legitimate protestors and those allegedly involved in violence.57 
The SAA’s military operations were all-encompassing and un-
forgiving, constituting collective punishment in a way similar to 
Hama in 1982.58 Having failed to prevent protestors from con-
tinually taking to the streets chanting anti-regime slogans by fir-
ing upon them, the Syrian military opted to deploy all-out 
military force in a way that would reduce the spatial possibilities 
for insurgency. The first siege was imposed on the city of Dera’a.  
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 On April 25, 2011, the army surrounded Dera’a, cut water 
and electricity supplies, shelled the city, and prevented the entry 
of humanitarian aid to the besieged population by either aid 
agencies or civilians.59 Security forces opened fire on residents 
who attempted to leave their houses in search of food or medi-
cine for the wounded during the 11-day siege.60 The SAA would 
replicate this pattern in many sites of unrest across the country 
in their attempt to quash the uprising. The official rhetorical jus-
tification for the high levels of violence was that by promising 
reforms, Assad had removed the grounds for continued demon-
strations.61 On April 16, Assad had declared “with these laws, 
we draw a line between reform and sabotage.”62 
 The Syrian military considered the first siege in Dera’a to 
be successful, withdrawing on May 5, 2011. Sieges were also 
imposed on Douma, Zabadani, Baniyas, and the Bab al-Seba’a 
and Baba Amr areas of Homs city between April 25 and May 6, 
2011. These sieges aimed to restrict the geographical possibili-
ties of insurgents’ attacks by hermetically sealing populated ar-
eas thought to be harbouring fighters, preventing their escape. 
Checkpoints were erected at strategic points of entry to the en-
circled urban areas, and snipers often covered areas in between, 
shooting all those attempting to escape.63 Restrictions on move-
ment were combined with artillery shelling, although at this 
early stage in the conflict, it did not specifically target the infra-
structure required for urban life, as is common with tactics of 
urbicide. Rather, these attacks seem to have constituted a com-
mon tactic of authoritarian counter-insurgency, seeking to ter-
rorise the besieged populations in hope of turning them against 
the rebels and thus preventing rebel mobilisation.64 The initial 
tactic of besieging restive areas was intended to be a short-term 
military tactic, using enemy-centric methods of counter-insur-
gency including violence and terror to force populations to with-
draw perceived support for armed insurgents. However, as these 
tactics proved insufficient to control areas of rebellion, the SAA 
shifted to a systematic campaign of destroying vital sites of ci-
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vilian infrastructure in a way that would force besieged popula-
tions to surrender by starving them. Investigating how siege tac-
tics were deployed in specific areas helps explain how the 
regime protected its grip over Damascus, which was crucial to 
its hold on power. The regime first employed tactics of urbicide 
in a besieged area in the southern suburbs of Damascus, in Yar-
mouk Camp.  
 
An urban siege – the siege of Yarmouk, Damascus  
The Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp lies in Damascus’ south-
ern suburbs, and had a population of approximately 800,000 be-
fore the beginning of the current Syrian conflict, consisting of 
roughly 150,000 Palestinians and 650,000 Syrians.65 Remem-
bering the September 1982 massacres in Sabra and Shatila in 
Beirut and the mass expulsions of Palestinians from Kuwait dur-
ing the 1991 Gulf War, the vast majority of Palestinians in Syria 
were determined to remain neutral during the Syrian uprising.66 
However, after the increasing arming of protestors in the sum-
mer of 2011, and the entry of regime forces to al-Ramel Pales-
tinian camp near Latakia in August, some Palestinians inside 
Yarmouk increased contact with the FSA. The regime was 
acutely aware of Yarmouk’s potential as a site of opposition ac-
tivity, as its strategic location made it a possible launch-pad from 
which rebels could advance into central Damascus, with supply 
lines available through the rural lands to the south of the camp.67 
Despite the majority of the camp residents’ attempts to maintain 
a neutral stance in the conflict, armed opposition groups infil-
trated the camp in the winter of 2012. Following this, Yarmouk 
became a target of sustained regime attacks.68  
 In August 2012, the SAA shelled the camp for the first time, 
reportedly killing 21 civilians.69 In December of the same year, 
hostilities reached a climax, and a battle between armed opposi-
tion groups and pro-government forces erupted. In an important 
escalation in the conflict, on December 16, 2012, Syrian jets 
were used for the first time to bomb densely populated areas of 
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the camp.70 The regime claimed this was a mistake, but indis-
criminate bombing was to become a common feature of the 
SAA’s counter-insurgency tactics, especially as continued de-
fections and mounting casualties stretched the regime’s forces.  
 After this incident, when more extreme Islamist factions, 
including Jabhat al-Nusra, stormed the camp, the SAA attempted 
to besiege Yarmouk, but supply lines from the south of the camp 
sporadically allowed in limited goods, meaning the siege was 
incomplete. By July 2013, the scarcity of goods, shelling, aerial 
bombardment, and the radicalisation of armed factions operating 
within Yarmouk, had motivated an estimated 85 percent of the 
camp’s population to flee.71 On July 15, 2013, the Syrian regime 
then imposed one of the most brutal sieges of the conflict to 
date.72 
 Systematically destroying the infrastructure upon which the 
camps’ residents relied, including water, sanitation and electric-
ity networks, the SAA prevented the movement of all people and 
goods in and out of the camp until April 2014.73 During this time, 
humanitarian conditions deteriorated to become some of the 
worst in the whole conflict. Amnesty International estimates that 
at least 194 civilians died, 128 by starvation, and others due to a 
lack of adequate medical care or sniping while foraging for 
food.74 In early 2014, the camp’s residents broke into an aban-
doned spice factory and survived for months from boiling weeds, 
spices, and water into a kind of broth, drinking just one cup a 
day.75 A number of residents reported having eaten nothing more 
than this for many weeks at a time.76 In October 2013, a fatwa 
was issued by Salah al-Khatib, Imam of Yarmouk’s largest 
mosque, lifting religious restrictions on eating cats and dogs in a 
desperate attempt to prevent people from starving to death.77  
 Beyond malnutrition, as a result of the tactics of urbicide 
the medical situation deteriorated with the destruction of the 
camp’s infrastructure. With no electricity networks and severely 
limited fuel supplies, residents of Yarmouk resorted to burning 
wood salvaged from destroyed buildings and the Syrian Ameri-
can Medical Society (SAMS) cites smoke inhalation as the cause 
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of death for a resident of Yarmouk.78 Severe shortages in medi-
cal supplies and the inability to operate medical equipment due 
to a lack of electricity led to fatalities from easily-treatable med-
ical problems. For example, several women died during child-
birth.79 As levels of sanitation have further deteriorated, 
communicable diseases have proliferated. After months of fears 
of the spread of typhoid in the camp, UNRWA detected as many 
as 90 cases among those residents of Yarmouk who were able to 
exit the camp to UNRWA mobile health units in the neighbour-
ing area of Yalda in September 2015.80 The Syrian regime has 
attempted to justify the blockade on basic medical supplies, in-
cluding bandages and baby formula, on the basis that they could 
be used to treat wounded opposition fighters.81 
 Because of the difficulties in getting basic goods into the 
camp during the most severe times of the siege, prices of basic 
food items increased exponentially, as seen in the table below 
(figures given in Syrian pounds and U.S. dollars to control for 
the inflation of the Syrian pound).  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of prices of staple goods in Yarmouk before the 
siege to when they reached their height during the siege, based on au-
thor’s data collected from residents of the camp 
Food 
item 
February 2011 
Prices (pre-
siege) 
April 2014 
Prices Increase  
SYP USD SYP USD 
Rice (1 
kg) 
80 1.68 10,000  67 40x 
Sugar (1 
kg) 
90 1.89 11,000 73.7 39x 
Flour (1 
kg) 
50 1.05 9,000 60.3 57x 
Bread 
(1.5 kg) 
15 0.32 1,000 6.7 21x 
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 The siege of Yarmouk represented a decisive evolution in 
the government’s use of siege tactics, as it was the first example 
of systematic urbicide during the current conflict. Rather than 
surrounding the area with armed forces and restricting the entry 
of goods alone, the regime’s fear of an attack on Damascus from 
Yarmouk led it to combine these tactics with targeted airstrikes, 
shelling, and a comprehensive seal on the area in an attempt to 
starve the camp’s residents and render continued life inside the 
camp impossible. This tactic has proved successful, as it cur-
tailed the ability of armed opposition groups to operate outside 
the camp, and prevented any major attack on the city centre. 
However, the regime was not able to establish such an intense 
siege on rural areas in which armed groups operated, such as the 
Eastern Ghouta, which also presented a threat to the regime’s 
grip on Damascus. 
 
A rural siege: the siege of Douma, the Eastern Ghouta 
Just as the rural farmlands of the Eastern Ghouta had once be-
come a centre of dissent against French occupation, with rebel 
groups able to conduct ambushes and then escape with relative 
impunity, the Eastern Ghouta also became a major site of armed 
opposition against the regime in the current conflict, with groups 
exploiting the geographical opportunities for insurgency pro-
vided by the rural landscape. Mirroring the tactics employed by 
the French in 1925, the SAA’s first major move against the op-
position groups in December 2011 was to cut off the town of 
Douma, the administrative capital of the Eastern Ghouta, from 
Damascus. Unlike the relationship between the inhabitants of 
Aleppo and its surrounding rural lands, many of which are 
marked by animosity, there were strong ties between Damascus 
and the Eastern Ghouta.82 Some of these networks were based 
on industry and land tenure, as many individuals living in Da-
mascus owned rural land to the east of the city. As such, the re-
gime feared the spread of opposition from the Eastern Ghouta 
into the capital, and so cut transportation links between the two 
areas.83 
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 By the end of 2012, after a prolonged period of fighting, 
large areas of the Eastern Ghouta had fallen under the control of 
an array of 16 different armed opposition groups.84 Unlike the 
urban Yarmouk camp, which could be surrounded and cut off 
with comparative ease, the rural lands of the Eastern Ghouta 
proved much more difficult to isolate, hence the proliferation of 
the various armed groups in the area. In 2013, leaders and civil 
servants from Douma who had defected from the regime created 
a local council that provided some services autonomously from 
the regime, including street cleaning, and the issuance of birth 
and death certificates.85 At the time, Douma represented one of 
the only credible attempts for opposition factions to establish an 
alternative administrative system to that of the regime, and it be-
came a military and administrative centre for the opposition-held 
areas of the Eastern Ghouta. Determined to destroy this rival ad-
ministration, but lacking the resources to launch a full-scale at-
tack into the area, the SAA established a full siege around the 
whole of the Eastern Ghouta in October 2013, mirroring the sec-
ond stage of the occupying French forces’ counter-insurgency 
operations against rebels in the area. A number of towns and vil-
lages fell inside the siege, including Harasta, Douma, Adra, Al-
Marj, Saqba, Maliha, Irbin, and Kafr Batna.86 The SAA enforced 
the siege by establishing a number of checkpoints at strategic 
entry points around the perimeter of the area, with snipers cov-
ering the farmland in between, in which they also planted 
mines.87 
 The siege that ensued destroyed much of the infrastructure 
in Douma, delivering a critical blow to opposition factions’ abil-
ity to use it as an administrative centre, and making Doumanis’ 
primary concern “simply avoiding death and finding food and 
shelter.”88 In June 2015, residents of Douma reported that the 
only water extracted from wells by hand pumps was available, 
and generators provided a maximum of two hours of electricity 
a day. In February 2015, local councils made the decision to re-
strict school hours, only opening early in the mornings “before 
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air strikes begin.”89 In addition to almost daily shelling and air-
strikes on civilian areas, an infamous Sarin chemical attack on 
21st August 2013 is considered to be one of the most serious hu-
man rights abuses during the Syrian conflict, killing hundreds of 
civilians.90 Although the regime denied responsibility for the at-
tack and a UN investigation was careful not to apportion blame 
for the attack, a report conducted by Human Rights Watch came 
to the conclusion that Syrian government forces were “almost 
certainly responsible.”91 
Unlike the urban siege of Yarmouk, the presence of agricul-
tural lands inside the besieged area of the Eastern Ghouta pro-
duced dynamics that rendered the nature of the siege distinct 
from those the SAA had hitherto imposed in urban areas. Firstly, 
the farmland inside the siege provided a limited source of food 
for the besieged population. While limited access to water and 
the lack of diesel to power agricultural equipment meant that ag-
ricultural output was severely damaged, farmers continued to 
cultivate crops and orchards in an attempt to provide food for the 
besieged market.92 However, airstrikes frequently bombed crops 
during or just before the harvest period, showing that even in the 
case of rural sieges, starvation remained a key aim of the SAA’s 
siege tactics.93 An UN official who entered Douma as part of an 
aid convoy described the besieged population as “skeletons 
floating in their clothes”.94 
 As with Yarmouk Camp, the medical situation in the be-
sieged areas of the Eastern Ghouta became dire. After regime 
strikes destroyed the electricity, water, and sanitation networks 
in the winter of 2012-13, residents resorted to irrigating agricul-
tural lands with sewage-contaminated water, which the Syrian 
Arab Red Crescent (SARC) linked to the outbreak of typhoid in 
August 2014.95 SAMS staff operating in the Eastern Ghouta es-
timated that even with bribes, the amount of medical supplies 
that they could smuggle in amounted to less than 5 percent of 
what was needed.96 As with the siege of Yarmouk, many people 
living in Douma and the wider Eastern Ghouta area have died as 
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a direct result of the conditions brought about by the siege. Dur-
ing the period between October 21, 2012 and January 31, 2013 
alone, SAMS collected evidence of at least 208 civilians in the 
Eastern Ghouta having died from malnutrition or lack of access 
to medical care. 
 Besieging the Eastern Ghouta served two principal pur-
poses in terms of the regime’s problems with manpower. Firstly, 
planting mines around the besieged area and manning the check-
points was a means of isolating the area with limited man-
power.97 Secondly, the siege of the Eastern Ghouta was one of 
the first instances in which the regime exploited the conditions 
of the siege to conscript young males into the army.98 The regime 
detained and forcibly conscripted some of these young men at 
checkpoints, but for others, unemployment, the dire humanitar-
ian conditions, and the continued military attacks led them to the 
conclusion that joining the SAA was the only means of escaping 
the situation.99 Therefore, siege tactics not only helped the re-
gime to operate with limited manpower, but were also a means 
of remedying these problems, as conscription is a common fea-
ture across various sieges. 
 
Conclusion 
Because the Syrian regime is authoritarian, its counter-insur-
gency campaign has not been subject to many of the constraints 
that affect other governments. In a comparable manner to au-
thoritarian counter-insurgencies elsewhere, the Syrian regime 
has utilized indiscriminate violence and countered this with nar-
ratives that sought to mobilise the Syrian population against 
those deemed to be foreign insurgents. Seen as a tried-and-tested 
tactic of counter-insurgency after Hafez al-Assad brutally 
quashed the Islamist insurgency in Hama in 1982, sieges were 
imposed early in the conflict across the country, in an attempt to 
repeat this past success. When the insurgency evolved into civil 
war in 2012, and as the SAA became increasingly over-
stretched, sieges proved an even more effective tactic for the re-
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gime, as they required limited manpower, and provided oppor-
tunities for conscripting civilians into the army. Sieges also al-
lowed the regime to utilise the military advantage provided by 
its air-force. Air attacks intensified the sieges, transforming the 
military blockades into a systematic campaign of urbicide in an 
attempt to render life in the besieged areas entirely unfeasible. 
 Siege warfare, therefore, is a military tactic that helps ex-
plain the longevity of the conflict in Syria. The Syrian regime’s 
tactics of counter-insurgency were instrumental in its strategy of 
protecting certain key strongholds, and sieges were a central el-
ement of this strategy. As we have seen, whenever a threat to 
Damascus emerged, such as in Yarmouk camp or in the Eastern 
Ghouta, the regime employed sieges to isolate the centres of re-
bellion and cut them off from external support, thus staving off 
the threat to the city. This logic also explains the prolonged siege 
the regime imposed on the city of Homs, which occupies a stra-
tegic location in between Damascus and Aleppo, and on the cor-
ridor from the capital to the Mediterranean coast, and the 2016 
siege of Aleppo city.100 Controlling these key cities was crucial 
for the regime to maintain the legitimacy it was afforded by pre-
senting itself as the sole actor capable of providing stability and 
services to the Syrian people, which explains its continuing sup-
port from a segment of Syrian society. 
However, given the severe humanitarian conditions and ex-
treme levels of destruction that sieges cause, it may seem sur-
prising that many sieges failed to force the besieged populations 
to surrender, and instead have endured for many years. Some 
scholars, including Stathis Kalyvas, have argued that indiscrim-
inate violence is often counter-productive, and that it actually 
provokes rather than dissuades insurgent violence.101 However, 
a more significant motivation for the longevity of sieges has 
been the emergence of new networks of profiteering in the war 
economy. The Syrian regime has failed, either through negli-
gence or necessity, to stop the spread of corruption within the 
SAA, and the prevalence of the practice of bribery. All 16 re-
spondents to my surveys from besieged areas noted that regime 
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soldiers allowed certain goods into the besieged areas if they 
were bribed enough, and this helps explain why many sieges en-
dured for years and failed to achieve their military objectives.102  
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Whose Problem Is It Anyway?  
The Depiction of Syrian  
Refugee Influx in Political Cartoons 
 
Özlem Özdemir &  Emrah Özdemir  
 
Political cartoons demonstrate the Syrian refugee crisis and their 
influx into bordering and European countries from different per-
spectives by using both visual and verbal metaphors in a carica-
turised way. For this reason, this research aims to reveal how 
political cartoons represent the perilous journey of Syrian refu-
gees and their families visually and verbally. In this regard, 
twelve political cartoons were selected randomly from the inter-
national political cartoon website cagle.com between March 
2011 and February 2016, referencing the Syrian refugee crisis, 
and have been analysed in accordance with metaphorical analy-
sis. From this point of view, as the theoretical framework, this 
paper uses a semiotic approach that points out the relationship 
between signs and meanings. Representation of the Syrian refu-
gee crisis, the political stances of the different countries, and 
their perceptions as reflected in political cartoons are the focus 
point of this research. Results show that countries remain gener-
ally indifferent to Syrian refugee movement. In fact, they do not 
see the issue as their own problem, and they only consider the 
threats to their security and socio-economic interests posed by 
the influx. Moreover, Syrian refugees are represented as lonely, 
vulnerable and unwanted.  
 
Introduction 
Cartoon, as a visual communication tool, can express different 
opinions and perceptions about various subjects, such as social, 
political, economic, artistic and historical issues. The difference 
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between cartoons and other visual communication tools is that 
they use satire, making readers laugh as well as think. As noted 
by Fiske (1990: 48), “cartoons are examples of messages which 
attempt to convey a wealth of information by simple, direct 
means—they use simple signifiers for complex signifieds.” Fol-
lowing this assumption, this paper focuses on political cartoons 
representing the visual and verbal image of the Syrian refugee 
crisis as a political, social, and cultural problem in a satirised 
way. From this aspect, this paper considers cartoons bearers of 
political thinking of the USA, neighbouring, European, and Arab 
countries.     
 The enduring conflict in Syria has entered its fifth year, and 
lack of a political solution, human rights violations, insecurity 
and abuses during this period have forced many Syrians to leave 
their country (OCHA, 2016). During this civil war, over 250.000 
civilians have been killed and over one million have been 
wounded. Almost 6.5 million Syrians have been internally dis-
placed - often multiple times - making Syria the world’s largest 
displacement crisis. Inside Syria today, it is estimated that 4.8 
million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in hard-to-
reach and besieged places. Insecurity and violence restrict hu-
manitarian access and aid services to various parts of the country 
(OCHA, 2016; UNHCR, 2015). 
 Due to these deteriorated circumstances, Syrians – who 
form one of the largest refugee groups in the world – are seeking 
protection, safety, and better life either in neighbouring or west-
ern countries. While the largest population of Syrian refugees 
have fled to the neighbouring countries, such as Iraq (245,022), 
Egypt (117,658), Lebanon (1,069,111), Jordan (637,859), and 
Turkey (2,620,553) (UNHCR, 2016), thousands of Syrians are 
on the move to European countries.  
 Syrian refugees illegally enter Europe either crossing the sea or 
land borders.1 They mostly travel unseaworthy boats and dinghies on 
the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, and distressingly, some of these 
journeys end in tragedy, as in the example of the dramatic death of 
three-year-old Aylan Kurdi (UNHCR, 2015). The number of Syrian 
Syria Studies   35 
refugees reaching Europe is increasing day by day, and 897,645 Syri-
ans had sought asylum in Europe between Apr 2011 and Dec 2015. 
This number comprises only 20 per cent of all Syrian refugees leaving 
their country (UNHCR, 2016). Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 
[1999]), Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark are the top countries receiving asylum applications. Other 
European countries, such as the UK, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, and 
Finland, have received only 12% of the total applications (UNHCR, 
2016).  
 Despite these increasing numbers, not all the European countries 
welcome Syrian refugees. On the contrary, they make serious efforts 
to prevent the flow of Syrian refugees. Austria, Macedonia, Hungary, 
and Slovenia, for example, erected fences to stop the flow of migrants 
(Graham-Harrison, 2015, Oct 31; Smale, 2015, Aug 24; Tomlinson, 
2015, Sep 10). Bulgarian authorities also took measures to restrict ac-
cess to their territory along the border with Turkey. They arrested 
6,600 Syrian refugees who irregularly crossed the Bulgarian border in 
2013 (UNHCR, 2014). Some newspapers carry the issue on agenda 
and broadcast their vulnerable position. News agencies broadcasted 
several incidents wherein Syrian refugees were beaten by police or 
soldiers when they wanted to cross the fences (Thornton, 2015, Sep 6; 
Withnall, 2015, Sep 6; Foster, 2016, Feb 20).  
 However, European populations did not pay a lot of attention to 
refugee crisis until the media broadcasted two events: the dead body 
of three-year-old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi’s, washed up on a Turkish 
shore after drowning on the journey, and fifty-three-year old Syrian 
refugee Osama Abdul Muhsen being tripped by a Hungarian cam-
erawoman while he was carrying his son on the Hungary-Serbia border 
(Tharoor, 2015, Sep 3; Lister, 2015, Sep 18). These two symbolic in-
cidents brought the situation of Syrian refugees who flee from war, 
poverty, persecution, conflict, and violence, to the forefront of public 
discourse. In addition, these two incidents highlighted the dilemma of 
the western countries between their hesitancy arising from security, 
economic, and social concerns, and their ethical responsibility toward 
the innocent Syrians abandoning their lives for a better life at the risk 
of death.   
 It is possible to cite more tragic incidents of the Syrian refugees 
trying to reach the shores of Europe. There are two main reasons why 
millions of Syrian refugees prefer EU countries to Arabic ones. Firstly, 
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although the Gulf countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are among the 
largest donors to Syrian refugees, these Arabic countries do not allow 
entry of Syrian refugees to their lands. This is not a particular concern 
about the Syrian refugees, but rather, none of these countries officially 
recognizes the legal concept of refugeehood. None of the six Gulf 
countries has ever signed the international resolutions on refugee 
rights and statelessness, which began to be recognised after World War 
II. The second reason is that EU countries have signed the UN Con-
vention on refugees that grants important rights to a better life. Be-
sides, there are some EU countries, which give legal status to refugees. 
To date, there is no internationally standardised comprehensive refu-
gee policy to solve the refugee crisis, and this issue is also one of the 
biggest contributing factors to the crisis (Malsin, 2015, Sep 8; 
Kinninmont, 2015, Sep 9).   
Although these issues have been addressed in the media 
through different mediums, such as documentaries, news pro-
grams, and in-depth researches, political cartoons have been ig-
nored by the literature. Almost all the political process of the 
Syrian refugee crisis and their route to the borders of EU coun-
tries are depicted by political cartoons, especially from critical 
perspectives. Therefore, this research focuses on political car-
toons to consider the Syrian refugee crisis from a different point 
of view. Political cartoons were selected randomly from ca-
gle.com international, a political cartoon website which gives the 
best examples of cartoons. Political cartoons use visual meta-
phors to interpret the Syrian refugee crisis humorously. Political 
cartoons not only involve visual but also textual messages on 
political events presented through cultural symbols. It is an im-
portant social medium due to its multiplicity of meaning and 
forms (Göçek, 1998: 2). Cartoons simply explain and summarize 
the flow of Syrian refugees and reactions of Western and Arabic 
countries on social media, newspapers and magazines. They also 
illustrate the difficulty of the Syrian refugees’ journey through 
both sea and land. Since political cartoons use textual and visual 
messages simultaneously, they are more effective in drawing the 
attention of societies, states, or governments to the unimaginable 
Syria Studies   37 
situations of Syrian refugees. From this aspect, this research can 
make an important contribution to better understand the different 
perceptions on the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as fill the gap in 
the literature in terms of the analysis of political cartoons as a 
different way of expressing political criticism.  
 Consequently, this paper aims to contribute to the existing 
literature in four ways. Firstly, it helps to understand the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Secondly, it shows clearly how Syrian refugees 
are represented visually in political cartoons. Thirdly, it illus-
trates the response of countries to the refugee problem. Lastly, it 
also draws attention to the global refugee crisis and the circum-
stances of asylum seekers.  
 
Cartoons as bearers of political thought 
Political cartoons are a satiric source of information and truth 
about universal and local events. They are usually thought-pro-
voking and attempt to inform the viewer about a current issue. 
With their messages, they touch the conscience and emotions of 
readers and inform them of what is going on around them. Be-
cause they are also a voice for the disenfranchised and the un-
derdog, they have power to sway public opinion (Press, 1981: 
62; Neighbor et al., 2003).  
 Political cartoons represent the visual and verbal image of 
political, social, and cultural problems or events through satire. 
The verbal and visual messages of cartoons try to convey a 
wealth of information by simple, direct means, using simple sig-
nifiers for complex signifieds (Fiske, 1990: 48). Because of the 
multiplicity of meaning and forms embedded within their visual 
and verbal messages, political cartoons are a significant social 
medium (Göçek, 1998: 2), a social medium that carries its mes-
sages with signs such as index, symbol, and icon.  These signs 
are methods of creating meaning for political cartoons. In an 
icon, for example, the sign looks and sounds like its object. In 
the case of index, the sign and its object are directly connected 
with each other. It is simple to explain icon and index with ex-
amples. A photograph, for instance, is an icon; smoke is an index 
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of fire. Regarding symbol, it is a sign whose relation with its 
object is a matter of convention, agreement, or rule (Fiske, 1990: 
46). A good coat, for example, protects its owner from cold, rain 
or snow. However, wearing an expensive well-known brand is a 
sign of wealth, identity, social status, social approval, and fash-
ion.   
 Besides icon, index, and symbol, political cartoons also use 
metaphors to create agenda on political issues sarcastically. Met-
aphors mainly use visual mode to transmit meaning through hu-
mor. They visually or verbally summarise the social, cultural or 
political issues (El Refaie, 2009: 174). Thus, political cartoons, 
which are published in the editorial or comments pages of a 
newspaper, are a rich source of metaphors (Gamson and Lasch, 
1983: 399; Templin, 1999; El Refaie, 2009: 174-175). However, 
caricaturists must be cautious about their visual and verbal met-
aphors, so as not to offend other nationalities. Beliefs, cultures, 
religions, customs, or traditions, are the sensibilities of nations 
or persons. For this reason, caricaturists ought to think from dif-
ferent cultural perspectives when drawing metaphors.2  
 Political cartoons are a form of visual news discourse. It is 
through comedic conventions that cartoons seize upon and rein-
force common sense, and thus enable the public to actively clas-
sify, organize and interpret meaning in what they see or 
experience about the world at a given moment. This study exam-
ines political cartoons as a form of satirical journalism and a type 
of visual opinion news discourse, and theorizes on the role of 
cartoons in the construction of social problems. Political car-
toons offer newsreaders condensed claims or mini-narratives 
about putative “problem” conditions and draw upon, and rein-
force, taken-for-granted meanings. By doing so, political car-
toons provide metalanguage for discourse about the social order 
by constructing idealizations of the world, positioning readers 
within a discursive context of “meaning-making”, and offering 
readers a tool for deliberating on present conditions. Cartoons 
“frame” phenomena by situating the “problem” in question 
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within the context of everyday life and, in this way, exploit “uni-
versal values” as a means of persuading readers to identify with 
an image and its intended message (Greenberg, 2002). 
 
Metaphors  
Visual metaphor, “as the pictorial expression of a metaphorical 
way of thinking” (El Refaie, 2003: 75), is the representation of 
an image or idea through a visual image that bears a particular 
similarity or resemblance. This similarity between the images 
can be cognitive as well as physical. From that aspect, visual 
metaphor uses images or symbols to express the cartoonist’s ar-
gument. Therefore, some researchers mention them as works of 
art (Green, 1985; Serig, 2006). For example, visual arts such as 
drawing, painting, printmaking, design, crafts, ceramics, car-
toons, ballet, photography, sculpture, filmmaking, and architec-
ture, are based on non-verbal metaphors (Knowles and Moon, 
2006: 107). All these are visual metaphors that employ visual 
images to express the ideas and emotions of the artists (Carroll 
1994: 190). Political cartoon also uses visual metaphors as rep-
resentations of thoughts, critiques, and opinions. Besides, it is 
possible to support visual metaphors by using explanatory texts 
or dialogues. Therefore, it is a part of visual communication, 
which carries visual knowledge about social, political, and cul-
tural issues. Thus, metaphors must be evaluated within their so-
cio-political context (El Refaie, 2003: 75).  
 According to the researchers, describing metaphor as vis-
ual, pictorial or non-verbal (Hausman, 1989; El Refaie, 2003; 
Knowles and Moon, 2006: 109, 117; Serig, 2006), verbal con-
cepts are expressed through pictorial metaphors in political car-
toons. Using metaphors is also important in speech and writing 
to explain, simplify, define, express, estimate and entertain top-
ics. Therefore, cartoonists use verbal metaphors to express what 
they think or how they feel about issues, or to convey a meaning 
in a stronger, more exciting and more imaginative way (Knowles 
and Moon, 2006: 3). As Swain (2012: 86) states, verbal texts of 
cartoons may include “captions, in-text labels, signs, placards, 
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speech or thought bubbles – rarely consist of more than two 
clauses, and sometimes of a single word, but are essential to the 
cartoon’s evaluative coherence.” For example, fox in literal 
meaning is an animal, but its metaphorical meaning is a cunning 
or wily person. While literal meaning here is the most basic 
meaning, metaphor is considered as non-literal language that in-
volves some kind of comparison, identification, or cognitive as-
sumptions (Knowles and Moon, 2006: 5). 
 Cognitive framework regarding metaphors depends on the 
embodied human experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003). Ac-
cording to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, interpretation and per-
ception of metaphor depend in part upon the participants’ social, 
cultural, political, and educational background (El Refaie, 2003: 
173). Therefore, both visual and verbal metaphors are decoded 
in the context of human experience (Yus, 2009: 148). For this 
reason, political cartoonists must be very careful about the in-
tended metaphorical interpretation of the cartoon. Universal 
metaphors are appropriate examples for inferential phase of 
readers (El Refaie 2003: 81).  
 Since political cartoons are rich sources of metaphors 
(Gombrich, 1971; Gamson and Lasch, 1983: 399), metaphor 
analysis is used to answer the research question. Metaphor anal-
ysis is one of the interpretive research methods (Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea, 2006: xix) used to analyse political cartoons. 
According to Fiske (1990: 92), metaphor is used to express the 
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. It is a way of explaining, de-
scribing, and evaluating abstract and otherwise difficult concepts 
(Knowles and Moon, 2006: 48). In this research, twelve political 
cartoons were selected randomly from cagle.com, an interna-
tional political cartoon website, between March 2011 to Febru-
ary 2016, which present different aspects and perceptions about 
the issue of the Syrian refugee crisis.  
 The main research question of the paper is how political 
cartoons represent the Syrian refugee crisis and the influx of ref-
ugees into bordering, Arab, and western countries. As noted ear-
lier, verbal and visual metaphors are important parts of social 
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and political context. Analysis of these representations thus il-
lustrates social and political perceptions of the international so-
ciety as well. To maintain analytic integrity and systematic 
analysis, cartoons are analysed according to these thematic head-
lines: “Syrian refugee influx to border countries”, “EU response 
to refugees”, “U.S. response to Syrian refugees”, and “The Gulf 
countries’ response to Syrian refugees”.  
 
Syrian refugee influx into border countries 
This dramatic refugee crisis changed agendas, topics, and head-
lines of the media. It also became an important issue in political 
cartoons. Cartoons have great importance for framing phenom-
ena by situating the problem in a visual and verbal context. They 
also persuade readers to identify with a visual image and its in-
tended verbal message (Greenberg, 2002: 182). Since the begin-
ning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, more than four million 
Syrian refugees have been forced to flee their homes for safety 
and protection. The majority of Syrian refugees have fled into 
bordering countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. 
 The refugee influx has caused important demographic 
changes in these neighbouring countries. With the increasing 
number of refugees, various problems have emerged, such as ed-
ucation, healthcare, accommodation, employment, and sustaina-
ble sources for the other necessities of these people. Without any 
systematic and sustainable political solution for the crisis, these 
countries have tried to implement new measures to alleviate the 
burden on their economies (Balsari et al., 2015: 942). Although 
international organizations, and other countries individually, 
have supported these efforts of the neighbouring countries, the 
social and ethical responsibilities toward, as well as the eco-
nomic burdens of, these refugees far outweigh the assistances. 
 This situation is illustrated in political cartoons with the vis-
ual metaphor of giant waves caused by a flood. From this aspect, 
the Syrian refugee influx is likened to a natural disaster, abrupt 
and destructive (Figure-2). This metaphoric expression relies on 
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two different meanings of ‘influx’. According to Collins Dic-
tionary (2016), the first meaning of the word is “the arrival or 
entry of many people or things.” Another meaning of influx is 
the act of flowing in; inflow.  From this perspective, in the car-
toons, the idea that the danger and risk of the influx is far beyond 
the capacity and capabilities of the neighbouring countries is il-
lustrated with this visual metaphor.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In Figure-1, Nath features Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon 
and humanitarian agencies, solicitously lifting up their hands to 
stop the Syrian refugee wave exceeding the wall. The wall im-
plies the borders of the countries. Representatives of Turkey, 
Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon stand in knee-deep water. The stand-
ing water metaphorically implies the Syrian refugees who were 
already hosted by the bordering countries. The wave metaphor 
represents the serious danger of Syrian refugee flow. At the be-
ginning of the civil war in Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Leba-
non were the first countries to take on the burden of Syrian 
refugees. The insolvable Syrian crisis leads to more Syrian refu-
gee influx to bordering countries. Thus, the pressure and finan-
cial burden of the refugees has increased upon neighbouring 
countries. While Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon’s representatives are 
in black clothing, Jordan’s representative is in dark blue. Colours 
Figure-1 Syrian Refugees (Nath, 
2013) 
Figure-2 Syrian Refugee Flow 
(Nath, 2012) 
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are one of important elements of visual metaphor for conveying 
meaning to readers (Knowles and Moon, 2006: 112). The reason 
for dark blue colour is that Jordan already provides shelter to a 
large number of refugees from Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. 
Jordan has a history of taking in refugees especially from Pales-
tine. Thus, Jordan is used to refugees but now Syrians constitute 
the majority of Jordan's refugee population, according to the 
United Nations (Martinez, 2015 Sep 10). 
 International aid organizations and humanitarian agencies 
are represented as inadequate to maintain necessary conditions 
for the refugees in political cartoons. The intensity and speed of 
the rising influx is beyond their capabilities. In addition, the bu-
reaucratic mechanisms of these institutions also prevented them 
from reacting effectively to the need. As illustrated in Figure-1, 
humanitarian agencies also feel the same anxiety with the bor-
dering countries – the representative stands with a to-do-list or a 
document in his hand.   
 In Figure-3, the attitude and the level of international sup-
port are illustrated through stronger visual metaphors. Figure-3 
symbolizes the refugee crisis as a giant male refugee with a sad 
face sitting on an UNHCR desk. Behind the desk, a compara-
tively small man talking on the phone says that the situation is 
under control, without realizing the greatness of the problem. 
The cartoonist uses colour to express different meanings, simi-
Figure-3 Syrian Refugee (Nath, 2014) 
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larly to the previous cartoons. The dark colour of the refugee il-
lustrates the unpleasant and risky situation created by the influx. 
Patches on his pants and ripped shoes signify the poor condition 
of Syrian refugees. Heavy boxes next to giant man imply the 
burden of the Syrian refugee crisis. The small desk also symbol-
izes the inadequate efforts of the UNHCR.  
 In the political cartoons that illustrate the Syrian refugee in-
flux to border countries, cartoonists use natural disasters as a 
metaphor to signify the seriousness of the refugee crisis. By us-
ing a flood to illustrate the flow of refugees, they emphasise the 
danger that affects neighbouring countries. The dark colours of 
the cartoons also reflect the hopeless situation of the refugees. 
These cartoons illustrate the lack of comprehension and prepar-
edness of institutions of international support for this human suf-
fering by using international agencies and humanitarian 
organisations as important figures.  
   
EU response to refugees  
According to UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards (2015), 
there are seven factors that can explain why Syrian refugees are 
fleeing to Europe. Loss of hope for a solution in Syria, high costs 
of living and deepening poverty, limited livelihood opportuni-
ties, aid shortfalls, hurdles to renew legal residency, scant edu-
cation opportunities, and deteriorating security situation in the 
region comprise Edwards’s seven factors leading the refugees to 
seek better opportunities in European countries. Respect for hu-
man rights, good living conditions, opportunities, and respect for 
international law on asylum seekers, are a few of the benefits 
refugees expect to find in Europe. However, the increasing in-
flux creates big anxieties for European countries. According to 
political cartoons, security, social, and economic aspects are the 
main points that create hesitancies among European govern-
ments towards Syrian refugees. To prevent the influx, European 
countries have tried to take some precautions. Hungary, Greece, 
Bulgaria and Macedonia built fences to prevent the refugee flow. 
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Refugees were even beaten and treated badly by the police and 
border guards of these countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As seen in Figure-4, the exclusivist attitude of the European 
countries is symbolized with the physical obstacles such as 
barbed wires in political cartoon. In Figure-4, Kountouris uses 
dry humour to present the attitude of the European Union. He 
employs visual metaphors between the texture and fabric of the 
European Union flag, and their exclusionist manner illustrated 
by the wool-care label. The label indicates that the fabric is made 
from barbed wire. According to Kountoris’s idea, this exclusion-
ist behaviour of the EU is a characteristic of the Union more than 
an attitude. 
 
Figure-4 Pure Wool European Flag (Kountouris, 2016) 
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 The political cartoons representing the attitude of European 
countries often use the image of German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel to illustrate the discussion about whether European 
countries should accept Syrian refugees or not. In most of the 
cartoons, cartoonists picture the Chancellor in her red jacket. As 
an idea, in the uniform and dark nature of the European bureau-
cratic society, Merkel’s red jacket can be evaluated as a contra-
diction to the general attitude of the bureaucratic society. In 
Figure-5, Merkel is portrayed as unable to find any supporters 
for her positive attitude towards the refugee influx. All male pol-
iticians in dark suits are fleeing from Merkel’s suggestion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure-6 Hungarian Journalism (Kamensky, 2015) 
Figure-5 Merkel and Refugees (Janssen, 2015a) 
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Besides these cartoons, there are different cartoons present-
ing why European countries are afraid of refugee influx. Figure-
6 considers the reason as xenophobia. There are two flags repre-
sented in the cartoon; one is that of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL), the other one is Hungarian. Flags are one of 
the most common realizations of visual metaphors (Knowles and 
Moon, 2006: 112). The political cartoon portrays the unfortunate 
incident when the Hungarian camerawoman tripped a male Syr-
ian refugee with his son fleeing from police at refugee collection 
point. In the cartoon ISIL terrorists in black with knifes chase 
Syrian refugee man with his son on one side, and he is stopped 
by the Hungarian government symbolised by the camerawoman 
on the other side. “Tripping” implies the attitude of Hungary. 
The Hungarian government took some precautions to stop the 
Syrian refugees. First, it blocked its border with Serbia and built 
wire fence at the border to prevent the refugee influx. The Hun-
garian police arrested and prosecuted the refugees for commit-
ting illegal border crossing. The first refugee has been deported 
after a very fast trial and could not apply for asylum (Green, 
2015). These security considerations caused by the refugee in-
flux increased especially after the Paris terror attack on the even-
ing of 13 November 2015. As French Prime Minister Manuel 
Valls (2015) mentions, the European bureaucrats think that 
“some of the suspects in the Paris attacks took advantage of Eu-
rope's migrant crisis to ‘slip in’ unnoticed.” 
 The political cartoons generally criticise EU responses to 
the refugee crisis.  The exclusionist manner of EU countries is 
one of the important criticisms emphasised in the cartoons. 
Barbed wires and the Hungarian camera woman are the most 
widely used symbols of the cartoons. Another symbol is German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had a bit more positive attitude 
to Syrian refugees. However, Merkel has been criticised by other 
European bureaucrats due to her positive attitude, as illustrated 
in the cartoons.  
 
 
48    An Exploration of Impact: Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy 
The U.S. response to Syrian refugees 
The United States has also had a similar political attitude to Eu-
rope towards Syrian refugees. However, in the USA, the debate 
is between two different political parties. One side of the debate, 
consisting of the Democrats and other progressives, welcomes 
the refugees; however, most Republicans demonstrate a strict 
opposition to the idea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure-7 another important visual metaphor to express the 
attitude in the USA is the Statue of Liberty. The statue is an icon 
of freedom and democracy in the country, and has historically 
been a welcoming sight to immigrants arriving from abroad. In 
the political cartoons, the Statue is typically used to highlight the 
contradiction of the Republican’s attitude with the soul of the 
country as a place offering immigrants freedom and peace 
throughout history, since America is a country founded by im-
migrants.     
 Figure-7 demonstrates American people holding banners 
which include expressions against refugees such as ‘war refu-
gees go home’, ‘keep out’, ‘terrorists not admitted’, and ‘no Syr-
ians’. Matson uses the Statue as a visual metaphor to illustrate 
tolerance and a positive attitude towards the refugees. Moreover, 
he puts a teardrop on her cheek to emphasise the contradiction 
between the political attitude and the meaning embodied by the 
Figure-7 The Fear of War Refugees (Matson, 2015) 
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Statue. Other important details in the cartoon are a rope for exe-
cution hanging on the crown and pitchforks in their hands that 
symbolize hatred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
President Obama is also another popular figure in the cartoons. 
Figure-8, McKee’s political cartoon with the topic “Syrian Ref-
ugees”, represents the migration of Syrian refugee families to the 
USA. President Obama looks from the window of the 
Whitehouse to see the Syrian refugees. One Syrian refugee man 
appeals to Obama: “We’re Syrian refugees and the odds that any 
of us are terrorists is remote… So, can we stay with you?”  
Figure-8 Syrian Refugees (McKee, 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-9 Local Utah Governor Herbert (Bagley, 2015) 
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The Syrian refugee wants to say to Obama that he and the other 
refugees standing behind him are not terrorists, and they desire 
to obtain asylum in the USA. For this reason, Syrian refugees are 
waiting in front of the Whitehouse to get help from Obama as he 
said he is planning to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees (Healy and 
Bosman, 2015, Nov 16). 
 But, despite President Obama’s positive attitude, more than 
half of the nation's governors (Grand Old Party is a nickname of 
Republican Party) say Syrian refugees are not welcome into their 
states. As shown in Figure-9, Alyan Kurdi is a common meta-
phor to illustrate the tragedy of the innocent Syrian refugees. 
With the exception of Utah Governor Gary Herbert, all the Re-
publican-led states agreed to close their borders to Syrian refu-
gees. Since the Syrian conflict began, Utah has resettled 12 
Syrian refugees, from two families. The State of Utah expects to 
receive a few hundred more Syrian refugees between March and 
October (Canham, 2015, Nov 16). On the other side, Figure-9 
shows that Republican-led states do not see the Syrian refugee 
crisis as their own problem. As shoe prints seen in the cartoon 
show that they just passed by the dead body of Aylan Kurdi, even 
saying: ‘C’mon Gary. Not our Problem’ when he was looking 
sadly to lifeless body washed up on the Turkish shore. The 
Statue of Liberty symbol on the left top of the cartoon implies 
freedom and U.S. democracy, which is assumed to have a posi-
tive attitude towards the migrants as a migrant country. Thou-
sands of Syrian refugees arrive to the country of freedom and 
democracy to seek asylum. But their arrival is not welcomed in 
many parts of the USA. 
 The cartoons illustrate the U.S. response to the refugee cri-
ses by emphasising an important contradiction between the fea-
ture of the country as a refugee country and negative attitudes 
among politicians. In the cartoons, the American politicians try 
to isolate their country from the refugee crisis. The Statue of Lib-
erty is a common symbol used in the cartoons. Security risks that 
might be posed by Syrian refugees are another important subject 
of the cartoons. 
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Gulf countries’ response to Syrian refugees 
Persian Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have been 
criticised for not opening borders to Syrian refugees. Convention 
and protocol relating to the status of refugees is one of underly-
ing reasons for this situation. According to the Convention 
(UNHCR, 2010: 14) relating to the status of refugees, a refugee 
is defined as:  
A person owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it. 
 
 
 Gulf countries were not among the twenty-six states who 
signed the protocol. Thus, Syrian refugees in these countries are 
not formally registered as “refugees”, but rather as “guests”, or 
“workers”. Therefore refugees do not receive protection, sup-
port, or the possibility for citizenship within the Gulf countries. 
Figure-10, Englehart’s political cartoon with the title “Not our 
Figure- 10 Not our problem (Englehart, 2015) 
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problem,” reflects the attitude of Gulf countries towards Syrian 
refugees. Gulf countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates turn their back to 
Aylan Kurdi’s lifeless body on the shore. Saudi Arabia’s repre-
sentative says: “Not our problem.” Gulf countries have been crit-
icised for tepidness, inaction, and unconcerned responses to 
Syrian refugee crisis.  
 
 
Figure-11 Arab Refugee Response (Heller, 2015)  
 
 The same tepid situation of the Gulf countries is portrayed 
in Figure-11, as a representative of the U.S., illustrated as Uncle 
Sam, asks Gulf States: “Why aren’t you Arab countries taking in 
those poor Syrian refugees?” Saudi Arabia, represented as 
spokesperson of the Gulf counties, replies in Spanish: “Ahhh… 
No hablo Ingles?” (I don't speak English). In sum, both the USA 
and the Gulf countries are recriminating each other with differ-
ent languages. It implies their ignorance of the refugee crisis. At 
the same time, in the figure, gunny sacks in front of all the Gulf 
countries signify their wealth and richness with the dollar sym-
bol on them. Their black sunglasses are the sign of their blind-
ness to the refugee crisis. Additionally, the cartoonist illustrates 
the Arab man speaking in Spanish as a reference to the US atti-
tude to asylum claims from Mexico. 
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A few cartoons related to the attitudes of Arab countries use 
similar metaphors within previous cartoons to illustrate Euro-
pean and US attitudes. For instance, in Figure-12, Zanetti pic-
tures a golden Arab male statue as a reference to the Statue of 
Liberty. However, this statue reflects the negative attitude of the 
Arab countries; he is a wealthy male figure holding a sack with 
the dollar sign on it differently from the Statue of Liberty. The 
text above the cartoon also refers to the New Colossus, but in-
stead of welcoming migrants, it emphasizes wealth as a criterion 
for acceptance.  In addition, there is a western male figure hold-
ing a female refugee with her baby in his arms in the cartoon. 
The western male figure brings the refugees to the Arab coun-
tries, but a typical Arab male figure similar to the statue refuses 
the refugees since they do not fit their wealth criteria. The Arab 
male figure’s fat body also illustrates the wealth of the Arab Gulf 
countries. 
 In the last group of the political cartoons, the cartoonists il-
lustrate the political decisions of the Gulf Countries which reject 
Syrian refugees, although they are the neighbours of Syria. In 
these cartoons, these Arab countries are illustrated as wealthy 
and selfish people besides the poor and in-need Syrian refugees. 
Figure-12 Wealthy Arab States Refuse Refugees 
(Zanetti, 2015) 
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In addition, there is a similarity between the negligent attitude of 
American politicians, and the Arab countries in the cartoons. 
  
 Conclusion 
The twelve political cartoons, analysed here, are addressing 
the Syrian refugee influx to bordering, Arab, and western coun-
tries, and their responses to refugee crisis. After the conflict in 
Syria, thousands of refugees have fled into neighbouring coun-
tries. At the beginning, the Syrian refugee problem was seen as 
the problem of bordering countries. Then, the Syrian refugee cri-
sis became the main topic in the agenda of the international so-
ciety, with the huge influx of Syrian refugees into EU countries 
to seek asylum.  
 There were three top topics discussed in mass media. 
Firstly, how it is possible to stop the Syrian refugee flow into 
Europe. Secondly, their perilous journey by the Mediterranean 
Sea and the Eastern border route after the image of Aylan 
Kurdi’s dead body washed up on a shore spread throughout the 
world, and the Syrian refugee who was tripped while carrying 
his son by a Hungarian camerawoman on the border, carried on 
the agenda. After these sad events, some EU countries gave asy-
lum to hundreds of Syrian refugees. These incidents, which were 
used as symbols in political cartoons, caused deep debates on the 
ethical responsibility of the global community toward these hu-
man sufferings, and the social, economic, and political threats 
posed by the influx in Europe as well as in the USA. Thirdly, 
which country should take the responsibility of the Syrian crisis?  
 Due to the security concerns, and their ‘guest’ status in the 
Gulf countries, the USA, the EU, and Gulf countries, do not see 
the Syrian refugee crisis as their own problem. Countries visu-
ally and verbally depicted as insusceptible and irrelevant to Syr-
ian refugee movement in political cartoons. Syrian refugees 
were depicted as masses, lonely, vulnerable, unwanted, and oth-
erwise. For instance, in the political cartoons that illustrate Syr-
ian refugee influx to border countries, cartoonists use natural 
disasters as a metaphor to signify the seriousness of the refugee 
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crisis. Instead of their suffering, the dangerous consequences of 
the refugee crises are emphasised in these cartoons. The dark 
colours of these cartoons also illustrate the negative attitude to-
wards the refugees.       
 The research has analysed different cartoons to reveal the 
attitudes of different countries and regions. Despite the socio-
cultural differences, cartoonists use similar metaphors to illus-
trate similar ideas. For instance, the barbed-wire metaphor is 
used as a symbol of the exclusionist attitude of all countries. 
Wave and flood figures are also commonly used in cartoons to 
illustrate the dangerous and destructive characteristics of the ref-
ugee influx. In addition, use of colours to express attitudes is 
similar in the cartoons. Thus, as cited earlier, dark colours gen-
erally symbolize negative attitudes. However, cartoonists use 
specific metaphors related to the different cultural, political and 
social contexts of the countries. For instance, in the cartoons il-
lustrating the attitude of the USA, political figures such as White 
House and the Statue of Liberty are specific metaphors that can-
not be understood by the audience who are not familiar with the 
context in the country. Metaphors gain special meanings and can 
be better understood within the social and political contexts of 
different countries. 
 Political cartoons illustrating different attitudes criticise the 
current situation, but the number of cartoons offering solutions 
to these human sufferings is limited. As an example, one of the 
most viable solutions for the refugee crisis is to enable a peaceful 
end for the tragic civil war in the country that evolved into a 
proxy war between different countries, ethnic groups and reli-
gious sects. The main driver of the influx is that these people do 
not have a proper life in their countries. In this regard, further 
analyses that evaluate these issues through the political cartoons 
in terms of visual and verbal metaphors should be done for a 
better understanding of different aspects of the Syrian refugee 
crisis. Analysis of political cartoons combining political science 
and communication literature is one of most appropriate plat-
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forms to make comprehensive analysis of the contemporary mat-
ters of the international society. Thus, these studies can help peo-
ple better understand each other’s opinions and perceptions as 
well as their feelings. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 There are six main migratory routes that Syrian refugees are using to enter 
the European countries. These are Eastern border routes (long land border 
between Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and its eastern 
Member States such as Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), Eastern Mediterranean route (from 
Turkey, Greece, southern Bulgaria or Cyprus), Western Balkan route, Apulia 
and Calabria route (from Turkey, Greece and Egypt), central Mediterranean 
route ( from Northern Africa towards Italy and Malta through the Mediterra-
nean Sea) and Western Mediterranean route (from North Africa to the Iberian 
Peninsula, as well as the land route through Ceuta and Melilla), according 
to Frontex. (2016, Jan 26) Migratory Routes Map.  
2 For instance, cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in several west-
ern newspapers have caused outrage among some Muslims in different inci-
dent such as the Charli Hebdo, the French satiric magazine which has been 
the target of two terrorist attacks, in 2011 and 2015 due to controversial 
Prophet Muhammad cartoons. For further examples, please see; Asser M. 
(2010) What the Muhammad cartoons portray. Available at: 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4693292.stm.  
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Interrogating the Construction of Gen-
dered Identity in the Syrian Nationalist 
Narrative:  
Al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi 
 
Rahaf Aldoughli 
 
This paper explores the politics of belonging and the alliance be-
tween the invisibility of women and the emergence of the con-
cept of nationalism in Syria in the late 20th century. It 
interrogates the considerable neglect of the question of women 
in the writings of the three Syrian thinkers, Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣarī 
(1880-1967), Michel ʿAflaq (1910-1989) and Zakī al-Arsūzī 
(1899-1968).1 I chose these three thinkers because of their prom-
inent role in shaping Syrian nationalist thought (Aldoughli, 
2016). Al-Husari has widely been considered the father of secu-
lar nationalism (Karpat, 1968: 28); his theorisation forms the 
ideological underpinning of the Baʿth Party, later founded by 
Aflaq and Arsuzi (Aldoughli, 2016; Dawisha, 2003: 3; Khad-
duri, 1970: 205; Salem, 1994: 49; Tibi, 1997: 203). Together, the 
narratives of these three thinkers constitute the basis of Syrian 
national thought, which has evolved around two overlapping yet 
diffusionist conceptions of nation and nationalism: emphasising 
the cultural identity of the nation, and achieving its political em-
bodiment—the Baʿth Party.2 These thinkers perceived the foun-
dation of Syrian nationalism as premised on a set of national 
sentiments, with language, history, and education (militarism) 
providing the main sources of cultural identity for the nation. 
While the three thinkers shared these sentiments, Aflaq and al-
Arsuzi identified the need to establish a political body to repre-
sent the nation through shared experiences of identification, such 
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as will and determination, pain and suffering, and sacrificial her-
oism. A close reading of these national elements will be the first 
step towards unveiling the construction of gendered identity in 
Syrian nationalist thought. As these thinkers’ narratives contex-
tualise the emergence of nationalism in the second half of the 
20th century (Aldoughli, 2016), this paper goes beyond the argu-
ments of attributing gender hierarchy to religion and culture, 
and, rather, recognises the importance of investigating the early 
emergence of nationalist narratives as a crucial dimension in 
producing a masculine national identity in national imagining. 
 
Introduction 
By analysing the nationalist theories of al-Husari, Aflaq and al-
Arsuzi, two interconnected themes emerge. First, the contextu-
alisation of the concept of the nation as a natural extension of the 
family underlines the dominance of the father figure in both in-
stitutions. Second, the use of universal terms to refer to ‘people’ 
(jamāhīr; shaʿb), and their frequent substitution with masculine 
labels such as ‘men’ (rijāl) and ‘young men’ (shabāb), excludes 
women from the national imagination. This linguistic phenome-
non is not confined to Syrian national theories (see McClintock, 
1991, 1993; Okin, 1980), but it has contributed to the erasure of 
women from Syrian national memory.3  
Whilst this omission of women generates an impression that 
men are ubiquitous, the exclusion of women from the Syrian na-
tionalist narrative has maintained power relations and bolstered 
hierarchies in the national imagination. Throughout the present 
study, I intend to explore gender bias in the definition of nation 
and nationalism by first, interrogating the language used by these 
thinkers; and second, questioning the ‘absolute will’ mediated 
by the male figure as warrior and revolutionary in the nation, and 
as the patriarch in the family. Such hierarchical symmetry be-
tween the private and public spheres has reinforced an essential-
ist conception of the role of women, and, concurrently, portrayed 
men as occupying an all-encompassing role in the family, soci-
ety, and the nation.    
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Looking at how nation and nationalism have been narrated 
can help us understand how contemporary thinkers conceive pol-
itics of national belonging. Whilst one may argue that the ab-
sence of women from national narratives is rather universal and 
not exclusive to the Syrian context (Aldoughli, 2014; Jaber, 
1997: 105; Pateman, 1988; Philips, 1991), it cannot be ignored 
that the subordinate position of women in early political philos-
ophy has relegated women to a secondary position in contempo-
rary politics (see Okin 1980: 3-5). Okin’s significant account of 
the consequences of Western national narratives in relegating 
women to a secondary status in Western states is a leading ex-
ample of the importance of investigating the construction of gen-
der in national narratives (ibid). In the same spirit, and using 
Anderson's thesis that nations are “imagined political communi-
ties” as a guiding principle (2006), I argue that an examination 
of the writings of the three Syrian thinkers illuminates how the 
national narrative has defined the rights and responsibilities of 
women and men as members of a national community, and also 
sheds light on the assumptions behind these definitions.  
Starting with the importance of investigating the language 
of national narrative as it portrays a form of ‘power’, we can ar-
gue that the missing representation of women produces a mas-
culinist imagining of the nation (Okin, 1980: 4). Berger et al. 
argue that “the formation of gender differences in language – 
that is, the ways in which categories of the masculine and the 
feminine are defined by and eventually ingrained in language – 
most often produces a rigid and fictive construction of real-
ity’’(1995: 3-4). Scott demonstrates that the gender bias, which 
can be traced in the writings of most contemporary theorists, has 
become a naturalised given (1993: 397). Scott further contextu-
alises the authority of masculinist writing and reveals how it is 
infused with presenting one dimension of ‘experience’ and ex-
cluding the ‘other’, which is in turn reflected in the production 
of national identity (Scott, 1993: 412; see also Connell, 1987: 
109). Hence, this subjective ‘authority’, as reflected in the theo-
rists’ nationalist language and perspectives, is a reflection of 
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women’s absent image and voice from history (Rowbotham, 
1973a: 32; Scott, 1993: 403, 405).  
More importantly, there is an intimately-linked affinity be-
tween the construction of the national narrative and the construc-
tion of manhood. In this respect, Enloe demonstrates the close 
association between the missing representation of women and 
the construction of masculinity in national narration. In other 
words, nationalism becomes a reflection of an image of man’s 
memories, humiliations, and hopes (Enloe, 1990: 45; see also 
Aldoughli, 2014; Lyotard and Clarke, 1978: 9; Mayer, 2000:9-
11).  
In his influential book Nation and Narration (1990) which 
offers a new substantive tool for analysing the construction of 
the nation, Homi Bhabha states: 
Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths 
of time and only fully realize their horizons in the 
mind’s eye. Such an image of the nation- or narration- 
might seem impossibly romantic and excessively met-
aphorical, but it is from those traditions of political 
thought and literary language that the nation emerges 
as a powerful historical idea in the west (Bhabha, 1990: 
1).  
The importance of these words lies in highlighting the associa-
tion between the construction of a nation and its narrative. In this 
sense, narrative can be conceptualised as a reflection of the dis-
torted presentation of women (see Foster, 1998: 38).4  
Conceptualising the Syrian national narrative, one can dis-
cern three distinct positions that define the cultural phase. The 
first concentrates on the notion that nations are natural exten-
sions of family. The paradoxical nature of conceptualising the 
nation as a “national family of man’’ is that such a notion rein-
forces gender hierarchy in the nation. It naturalises the suprem-
acy of the male patriarch within both family and nation 
(McClintock, 1993: 63). The second is the cultural construction 
of the nation as defined through implementing shared language, 
history and education. However, in the Syrian national narrative, 
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men are depicted as the ones who guard, preserve, and transmit 
these cultural identifications (Davis, 1997; Peterson, 1998). The 
third notion is defining national belonging as non-voluntary, 
whereas this naturalised belonging reinforces the ethos of mas-
culinised patriotism, sacrifice, and heroism.  
At the same time, although the civic phase expounded by 
Aflaq and al-Arsuzi provided different characteristics for the po-
litical embodiment of the nation—i.e. the state—this phase de-
fines the will and determination and shared pain and suffering of 
its men as markers of communal experience, markers which sub-
sequently act as a delineation of power relations. More im-
portantly, these concepts are perceived to be measured by 
masculinist identifications, which in turn politicise national 
boundaries around the heroic deeds of men only. In this regard, 
the emphasis on constructing communal experience serves as a 
trace of men’s historical national experience, thereby creating a 
hierarchal symbolisation of the nation.  
This national experience has been identified and measured 
by the twinned nexus of love of country and men’s readiness to 
sacrifice. Andrew Parker et al. argue that ‘a love of country’ is 
an ‘eroticised nationalism’ defined by men’s physical sacrifices 
(1992: 1). This raises the question of whether women’s absence 
in nationalist literature can be linked to women’s implied lack of 
love for their country and being stereotyped within certain em-
phasised roles of passivity, since the love of a country presuma-
bly requires the active militarised ability of its men. Such notions 
highlight the reasoning behind defining the nation as a fraternity, 
which is intimately linked with how women’s relationship to cit-
izenship will later be conceptualised (see Aldoughli, 2016a5; 
Badran 1993). This construction of idealised femininity and 
masculinity in national narratives defines ‘love of the country’ 
as a male arena, in which only ‘he’ is allegedly capable of de-
fending the fatherland. Hence, nationalism is reconciled with 
hegemonic masculinity and feminine exclusion; women are once 
more relegated to passive, subordinate dependents who require 
an active, dominant mobiliser.  
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Within these two phases, Syrian national narrative perpetu-
ates an obsessive representation of the nation as a community of 
men, imagined and defended by men. There is no denying the 
fact that this empowered masculine identification between the 
nation and men is a reflection of nationalism as “the exercise of 
internal hegemony,” as Tamar Mayer (2000: 1) masterfully puts 
it. Therefore, these constructed gender stereotypes reinforce the 
notion that the nation within these narratives is becoming ‘‘gen-
dered and radicalised’’ (Anthias and Davis, 1993: 127).6 Anne 
McClintock indicates that “all nationalisms are gendered, all are 
invented, and all are dangerous” (1991: 104-105). It is ‘danger-
ous’ in the sense that it reinforces power relations and incites 
hegemonic ideologies of masculinised violence (ibid). Moreo-
ver, Mosse argues that “nationalism had a special affinity for 
male society and together with the concept of respectability le-
gitimised the dominance of men over women” (Mosse, 1985: 
67).  
Finally, this gender bias, which can be traced in dominant 
theorisations of nation and nationalism, is not a coincidence; it 
stems from a ‘male-defined’ world wherein women are obscured 
in ‘brotherhood’. The excessively masculine language used in 
the nationalist narrative must not be underestimated; it reveals 
the “intense rejection’’ of women in history, and reflects how 
they are trapped in a world constructed and represented predom-
inantly by men (Rowbotham, 1972: 11). Therefore, after explor-
ing nationalist narratives, we are faced with the overlooked 
question of women: the exclusion of women in a manner which 
reconsolidates “centralized control of authority…including gen-
der privilege” (Pettman, 1996: 138). 
In line with the above argument, much of my analysis of the 
writings of al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi employ Nira Yuval 
Davis’ understanding of the intersection between gender rela-
tions and the formulation of the nation. Davis’ important contri-
bution suggests that no matter the characteristics of the nation 
(whether it is a cultural or civic construction), gender relations 
are deeply embedded in national formations (Davis, 1997: 21-
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5). Davis outlined five ways in which gender and the constructed 
identity of women intersect with the construction of nationalism: 
1- As biological producers of the nation; 
2- As cultural preservers that mark the nation’s identity 
and reinforce cultural boundaries. Women are con-
ceived as symbols and signifiers of national difference; 
3- As transmitters of cultural narratives (mothers, teach-
ers); 
4- As keepers of national boundaries by accepting or re-
fusing marriage from outside the national community; 
5- As active participants in national movements. 
The following discussion identifies these five gender-differenti-
ated dimensions in which Syrian women have been forcefully 
substituted with men in relation to national formation. Each sec-
tion will highlight how men are constructed as the main contrib-
utors to nation-building, whether in its cultural or civic phase. 
 
Al-Husari and the masculinist construction of cultural na-
tionalism: men as social reproducers of cultural forms 
Sāṭiʿ al-Husari, the father of secular nationalism in the Arab 
world, extensively debated the origin of the idea of nation and 
nationalism in his works (1959: 31; 1964a: 15-6; 1985a: 15-6). 
His nationalist theory constitutes the basis of the Baʿth ideology 
in Syria. Whilst one might argue that al-Husari’s nationalist ide-
ology was so thorough that it hardly left anything out (See Cleve-
land, 1971: 148), this overview of his works will reveal his 
disregard for women’s contribution to national formation. In this 
section, I intend to analyse al-Husari’s nationalist ideas with par-
ticular reference to the role of women and family in fostering 
national consciousness. In this context, a close reading of his 
three national elements—language, history, and education—
display forms of dominance and coercion in the construction of 
national identity.  
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‘The Soul’ of the masculinised nation 
In al-Husari’s theorisation, language plays the most pivotal role 
in defining not only the political and cultural boundaries of the 
nation, but also the gendered boundaries of belonging. Accord-
ing to al-Husari, the nation is a cultural entity that has naturally 
extended from the family. This naturalised conception of nation 
formation reinforces non-voluntary belonging to the nation.7 
Conceptualising language as the driving force behind fostering 
national identity raises the question of how al-Husari constructed 
a gendered understanding of the role of language. Al-Husari’s 
conceptualisation of national language can be summarised in 
four propositions. First, its role as the “soul of the nation;” sec-
ond, as a tool that protects the nation from losing its cultural 
character during times of war; third, as a tool that determines the 
political and cultural boundaries of the nation, and unites Arab 
countries through disseminating Standard Arabic and minimis-
ing the use of colloquial language; and fourth, as a preserver of 
national heritage in its capacity as the language of fathers.  
From the very outset, part of the formulation of al-Husari’s 
national ideology is based on internalising a gendered under-
standing of national love and belonging. In this sense, his ideo-
logical methodology is to insist on how to define ‘love’ for the 
nation (ummah) and the fatherland (waṭan),8 wherein al-Husari 
emphasises that national love is a substitution for familial love.9 
This primordial love is compared to a child’s love for his mother 
(1985a: 29). However, this definition of national love becomes 
part of an enforced and naturalistic sentiment that generates 
propaganda regarding how to produce an ideal image of the man. 
More importantly, national love constitutes a means of legitimis-
ing death for the nation, which is in turn embedded with gen-
dered interpretations of national belonging.  
The deep correlation between defining patriotic belonging 
and masculinity is further intensified by al-Husari’s social con-
struction of kinship (qarābah). He argues that ‘‘the important 
thing about kinship (qarābah) and lineage (nasab) is not blood 
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relations, but rather the belief in this relation’’ (1928). Al-Husari 
confirms that “spiritual kinship” is socially constructed through 
unifying language, history, and education (1985b: 105). How-
ever, despite disregarding the racial and ethnic origin of the na-
tion, al-Husari argues that the nation is a “brotherhood” and a 
“fraternity of descendants from one father” (1985b: 35). He fur-
ther argues that the inefficacy of the racial origin of the nation10 
is backed up by his idea of intermarriages (1959: 129). While 
these notions suggest that the nation is culturally constructed and 
preserved through language and intermarriages, al-Husari disre-
gards the role of women as custodians of the nation’s cultural 
identity through their marriages.11 Therefore, whilst the role of 
intermarriages in defining racial belonging to the nation high-
lights the role of women as producers of national boundaries, al-
Husari defines the nation as a “fraternity” and a “brotherhood”, 
based on solidarity between the brothers (ikhwan) (ibid).  
Identifying language as the soul of the nation, which medi-
ates and determines the mode of thinking among individuals, al-
Husari argues: 
Language is the most influential spiritual tie which 
binds mankind together. First, it is the means of mutual 
understanding among individuals. In addition, it is the 
instrument of thought… Finally, language is the means 
for transmission of ideas and acquired knowledge from 
fathers to sons, from ancestors to descendants. The lan-
guage with which man grows up can mould his thought 
in a special manner, and deeply influences his senti-
ments, his language which the individual listens to 
since childhood is the language of the mother (1928).  
The great importance al-Husari accords to language is juxta-
posed against the fact that he refers to the national language as 
the language of “the fathers” (1959: 56). However, he never 
mentions women’s role in socially and culturally preserving the 
language (see Davis, 1997; Peterson, 1998), instead he considers 
it the language of fathers only (1959: 56). Moreover, these words 
are highly reflective of al-Husari’s paradoxical position towards 
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women. Whilst he highlights the naturalised acquisition of the 
language through “mothers”, he still considers language to be 
transmitted from “fathers to sons.” Affording language this pa-
triarchal connotation, al-Husari disregards the influence of 
mothers in fostering the “sentimental” identity of the child. In 
other words, he denied women their cultural role in preserving 
the cultural identity of the nation. 
At the same time, the importance of having one national 
language is clarified in his own words as “a mere need for men 
in order to contribute politically to the nation” (italics added for 
emphasis, 1959: 67). These ideas significantly imply the insep-
arability of language and nationalism as the former is indispen-
sable to the modernisation of both political and social life (1959: 
67). Yet, al-Husari understands this link as pertaining to the pub-
lic sector (1959: 68). It is worth noting that al-Husari only gives 
importance to the use of language in the state apparatus to estab-
lish and disseminate the national language. However, he misses 
the role of the private sphere in reproducing language in the same 
effective manner. Paradoxically, whilst he ignores the role of 
women in enacting this preservation, he affirms that the most 
important aim is to promulgate the national language through the 
state apparatus (1959: 73).12 
Since language is such a driving element in his conceptual-
isation of nation formation, al-Husari adamantly shows his dis-
satisfaction with the use of colloquial Arabic (al-ʿarabiyyah al-
ʿāmmiyyah). According to him, its widespread usage has divided 
and weakened the sense of national unity among Arab countries. 
It must be noted that his view on how to deploy Standard Arabic 
and curb the usage of colloquial Arabic is to promote Standard 
Arabic through the state apparatus (1985f: 30). Yet, he stresses 
that, in order to deploy Standard Arabic, there is a need to rein-
force the role of “intellectual men” by adopting their language 
and style (1985f, 29, 32). What is missed in his proposition is 
the fact that unless mothers at home minimise the use of collo-
quial Arabic, the attempt to enforce the use of Standard Arabic 
is inefficient. More importantly, his perspective demonstrates a 
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rather biased perception of women’s intellectual contribution to 
Arabic literature and the Arabic language in his time (Altoma, 
1991: 79-91). 
By employing Nira Yuval-Davis’s account on women’s 
contribution to the construction of nation and nationalism, I will 
review al-Husari’s theory on men’s cultural, intellectual and he-
roic achievement. For example, he perceives language to be a 
part of the nation’s heritage that is only fulfilled by fathers of the 
nation. Nevertheless, al-Husari disregards the role of women and 
the family in ingraining the national language, and substitutes 
the role of mothers in disseminating the standard language with 
“men of letters.” This biased perception against the role of 
women and the private sphere in the inculcation of a homogene-
ous cultural identity through language has perpetuated hierarchy, 
coercion, and gender-bias, in the construction of national iden-
tity. This is in no way confined to language; indeed, these views 
encompass how al-Husari perceives history. The following sec-
tion will analyse how history is narrated in his national doctrine. 
 
Telling the masculinist narrative: men as transmitters of his-
tory and active participants in political struggles 
The second central feature in al-Husari’s nationalist conception 
is a unified version of history. In his definition of the nation as 
“a human being, with life and feeling. Life through its language 
and feeling through its history” (1985g: 19), al-Husari describes 
unity of history as it…  
…gives rise to shared feelings and views. It leads to 
collective memories of bygone exploits and past hard-
ships, and to a mutual faith in the awakening and to 
mutually shared hopes for the future … Every nation 
feels its self-consciousness and creates its personality 
by means of its special history (1928).  
Al-Husari’s notion of “special history” is a selective approach to 
history in which only particular events should be recorded in the 
national imagining to instill a patriotic identity. This culturally 
constructed definition of history, based on certain imagined 
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communal experiences of pain and joy (1985g: 19), raises the 
question of how this national imagining is discursively con-
structed, and whether women are included within this national 
imagining.  
In the introduction of the 2nd edition of his book Pages of 
the Recent Past (Ṣafaḥāt min al-Māḍī al-Qarīb), al-Husari indi-
cates that the re-publishing of this book is “of great benefits to 
young men (shabāb)13 of the ‘present’ and to the men (rijāl)14 of 
‘recent future’’’ (1948: 7). These words reflect al-Husari’s in-
tention of instilling a sense of collectivity through the use of 
masculine terms to refer to his audience. Using masculinised ter-
minology in relation to the past and the future generates a mi-
sogynist position towards women’s place in nationalism. In the 
same vein, this grouping of masculine peoplehood reinforces 
boundary relations in al-Husari’s narrative, which deems history 
primarily a male domain. Al-Husari proceeds in this book to call 
for reviving the past through creating a glorious present.  
The problem is that his concept of glorious present and fu-
ture is identified with empowering men and urging them to gen-
erate the “spirit of sacrifice and victory,” while on the other 
hand, urging men not to spread the “spirit of discontent, despair 
and surrender” (1948: 70).  What follows is an exaltation of 
death and sacrifice associated with the great deeds committed by 
men. In his concluding words, al-Husari defines life as synony-
mous with courageous death, which reasserts manhood and chal-
lenges potency (1948: 112). This gratification of men’s 
sacrifices attempts to measure national belonging by physical 
strength. This in turn exposes al-Husari’s construction of nation-
alism as intimately linked with constructing the ideal man of the 
nation. It becomes very clear to the close reader that al-Husari 
conceptualises the nation’s realisation of glory as man’s own 
achievement of manhood and masculinity. He argues  
The man loves the nation under the influence of nation-
alism, and his heart is attached to it severely, and con-
siders himself part of it, so he becomes happy 
whenever its glory increases, and suffers if its strength 
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reduces. He aspires to see it strong and developed, and 
be proud of its glories (amjād)…and tends to do what-
ever can be done to defend its existence and its dignity. 
Besides, the man loves his fatherland (watan) under the 
influence of patriotism…and seeks to serve it, and does 
not delay to sacrifice his soul for its sake (1985a: 27). 
These words highlight the extreme identification of nation’s 
glory (majd) with man’s love for the nation. Al-Husari further 
declares that these patriotic and nationalistic feelings are not 
only connected by spiritual ties but even resemble maternal love 
(1985a: 27-29). This portrayal of national love reflects the man-
woman relation of subordination and coercion. According to al-
Husari, it is this nationalistic and patriotic love that would 
awaken sentiments in people to struggle and sacrifice for na-
tional renewal and unity: “We must remember that the national-
ist idea enjoys a self-motivating power; it is a driving impulse to 
action and struggle. When it enters the mind and dominates the 
soul, it is one of the forces which awakens the people (al-shaʿb) 
and inspire them to sacrifice’’ (1951: 238-239). From these 
words, we can derive a picture of an overwhelmingly gendered 
representation that conceptualises national membership through 
physical sacrifice. It is related to the question of: who are the 
“people” (al-shaʿb) who may be connoted with the characteris-
tics of “action” and “struggle”? Moreover, it must be discerned 
that al-Husari’s use of the term (shubbān) ‘young men’ is an af-
firmation of the superiority of men as the only national believers 
in the nation. Hence, this juxtaposition between the assertion of 
nationalistic faith and the ability to sacrifice for the national 
struggle subsequently defines the concept of belonging (1985g: 
40). 
Because of his belief in the intrinsic value of national faith 
and patriotism, al-Husari points out that the greatest possible 
task for patriots is to prioritise national love over love of self. 
Al-Husari contends that the gravest enemy to the nation is ex-
cessive love to oneself as opposed to “altruism” and “sacrifice” 
(1985a: 117). It is, however, essential to examine the solution 
Syria Studies   77 
that al-Husari proposes to this “selfishness”. In his call for ulti-
mate national devotedness and love for the nation, al-Husari sug-
gests that the only means for raising, spreading and 
strengthening national consciousness is national education. He 
strongly believes in the role that national education can play in 
regenerating and creating a generation with national pride.   
 
National education: men as active participants in a milita-
rised nation 
In his consistent attempts to construe a secular perception of na-
tionhood, al-Husari relies on education to foster a homogeneous 
national identity (1985g: 20). As elaborated previously, accord-
ing to al-Husari national ties among individuals are established 
through a unified language and history. He further outlines edu-
cation as a means of instilling communal solidarity and sacrifice 
among the men of the nation. These patriotic sentiments are ex-
tolled as essential for the inauguration of national identity. Edu-
cation is used by al-Husari as a means to achieve a unified 
perception of nationhood among men through prioritising mili-
tarism and sacrifice as the ultimate goals which constitute the 
nation. Al-Husari classifies schools into two types:  the natural 
school—the home into which the child is born; and the primary 
school, conceived as the real social institution that fosters the 
national identity of the child. As such, according to al-Husari, 
formulation of national identity progresses through two stages. 
The first stage is during primary school, as it is the social and 
educational institution which nurtures, constructs, and prepares 
the child for the second stage—army conscription. It must be ar-
gued that considering militarism a part of the educational sys-
tem, which underpins the national upbringing of the child, 
illuminates the privileging of one sex over the other in the na-
tional consciousness. This narrative, undoubtedly, promotes the 
image of the male warrior as a representative of the nation. In al-
Husari’s own words:  
If we notice the role of these two institutions (the mil-
itary and the school) from a general social perspective, 
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we will find that there are many similarities: as the first 
(the school) takes the child from the family, and makes 
him join his peers, and the school pledges to bring up 
the individual nationally and socially (tarbiyyah) and 
educationally (taʿlīm) for the benefit of the nation. 
However, the second (military barracks) takes the 
young man from his environment, and makes him so-
cialise with other men that are prepared to serve and 
defend their nation (1985a: 450). 
From the very outset, these words leave no room for argument 
regarding unto whom al-Husari is addressing his narrative. The 
persistent overlap between the concepts of social and national 
upbringing (tarbiyyah) and militarism (ʿaskariyyah) leaves no 
space for women in his narrative. Worse, this conceptualisation 
of militarising men further promotes a hierarchal and hegemonic 
gendered identity in the national community.  
The insistence that militarism is complementary to school-
ing is strikingly short sighted. On one level, al-Husari’s percep-
tion of militarism as part of the educational system sustains an 
exclusionary narrative of female children on how they should be 
educated (as we will see later). Militarism effectively becomes a 
means of defining and maintaining group identity and affiliation; 
the army, as a representative of the nation, structures the politics 
of inclusion and exclusion in the national community. This be-
longing to and membership of the nation is best understood in 
the readiness to die for the nation, fostering a commitment to 
‘‘militarised and continuously politicised conception of life, a 
conception that is entirely masculinist’’ (Kateb, 2006: 8; see 
Aldoughli, 2016a). The role of the family is therefore disre-
garded and substituted with school and military barracks. More-
over, the glory of the nation, like the glory of a man, is measured 
in terms of heroism and militarism. Therefore, women become 
non-integral in the national discourse, propagating their image 
as naturally passive, whereas men are conceived as active par-
ticipants in the national struggle.  
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Al-Husari further expresses his attraction to the military 
barracks, to the extent that he considers their role to outweigh 
that of the school because they are more effective at controlling 
the life of the individual. Moreover, military life is a life “of ac-
tivity and fatigue, it strengthens the spirit of young men’s activ-
ity and movement, and gets them familiar with the roughness of 
life and develops their endurance of hardship, more importantly 
it develops their manhood … and the spirit of leadership that the 
nation needs most’’ (1985a: 450). In fact, conceptualising mili-
tary barracks to be agencies for raising and strengthening na-
tional consciousness, al-Husari’s theorisation of nationhood is 
based on casting men as a metonymy for sacrifice and altruism. 
This subsequently relegates women to an unknown place in the 
national discourse (1985a: 451).  
The use of schools and military service as a means of raising 
national and patriotic consciousness disregards the role of the 
family as an educational institution and neglects women’s cul-
tural role (1984: 15,35).15 And what he classifies as natural 
school; family, is rather disregarded as playing an important role 
in inculcating national identity. In this sense, nationhood be-
comes reliant on men’s realisation of heroism, manhood, and as-
pirations. Al-Husari argues that militarism plays a special role in 
fostering, strengthening, and forming nationhood:  
The soldier lives – during military service – outside his 
personal circle, and away from his personal life … He 
leaves his home, town, family and profession … He 
lives with a group of the sons of his fatherland who are 
from different towns and classes and who hold various 
beliefs and positions. He lives with them subject to a 
system in which they are included without exception. 
He lives there, not with the intention of returning to his 
original personality or of being confined to his family 
and a life cantered in his village. On the contrary, he 
works for a purpose which is loftier than all these, for 
a purpose which ensures the life of the fatherland and 
the welfare of the nation. Is there a need to clarify the 
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seriousness of the psychological and educational ef-
fects that occur as a result of this life in these circum-
stances? I do not know anything comparable to the life 
of the soldier, in their impact on the social qualities: 
military barracks as social schools, connect the indi-
vidual with the nation, and involve him in the most im-
portant episode of the community, and make him feel 
the existence of the nation and fatherland. He learns 
true sacrifice of blood and self in the cause of the na-
tion and fatherland. Therefore, we can say that the sys-
tem of military life is one of the most important and 
effective methods in social pedagogy (1944: 65). 
This extract emphasises the role of military life in strengthening 
ties among members of the nation, and perceives it as the source 
for producing and disseminating national consciousness. Leav-
ing aside the conceptualisation of militarism as a prerequisite for 
constructing a consolidated community based on internal soli-
darity, the normalisation of militarism in national narrative char-
acterises men as active participants in national-formation.  
Undoubtedly, this idealised perception of military life gen-
erates a hierarchal social order. According to al-Husari, there are 
three main social classes which form the nation:  
Every nation, from a social perspective, is composed 
of three basic social classes: The first one is composed 
of general people (sawād al-nās), the public. The sec-
ond one is the upper class; the elite, is composed of 
men (rijāl) that run the affairs of the nation, and have 
great influence on conducting these affairs, whether 
through enjoying official positions in the government, 
or by the virtue of enjoying a scientific, social or eco-
nomic status – and whether this is in the administrative 
or political field – or in the literary, industrial or trading 
one. The third class, is composed of men (rijāl) who 
occupy medium statuses in comparison with the gen-
eral public and the upper class. They represent the link 
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between the upper class and the general public one 
(1944: 77-78). 
In this passage there is a shift from the general use of shabāb 
which signifies young men, to a more specific use of rijāl which 
signifies mature men. This linguistic usage reinforces an image 
of the nation as a community composed of and based on men. 
The term rijāl ([mature] men) connotes a privileged gender, 
masking a hierarchal perception of the nation. Within this con-
text, there is an infused connotation between hierarchy and mas-
culinism, and those in the upper class are all men. Even the 
middle class, those who enjoy higher scientific or financial sta-
tus, are specified as men only. The reader is left wondering 
where women fit within this social classification, and how the 
two fields of politics and education, represented respectively by 
the upper and middle classes, are restricted to men only. Women, 
in this sense, are not even part of these two classes, which hold 
the most important national front. However, one might consider 
that women are positioned within the ‘general class’ 
(sawād/ʿāmmat al-naās), which is deemed the uneducated class 
(1944: 77-79).  
Gender-bias can be further traced in al-Husari’s extensive 
exploration of what men should choose for their future profes-
sions. Al-Husari asserts the importance of choosing entrepre-
neurship and investment for the growth of economy (1984). He 
urges young men to choose business and commerce for their sig-
nificant benefits in modernising society, and in turn the nation. 
This deep consideration for how men should improve the nation 
and promote national consciousness through their professions 
demonstrates al-Husari’s misogynistic views on women’s role 
as mothers and individuals. This is evidenced, first, in his failure 
to advance a parallel perception of how women could become 
more effective contributors to society. Second, he asserts that 
mothers have a bad influence on their sons’ professional choices 
(1984: 73-82). It might be suggested that because al-Husari was 
aware of the greater lack of education among women, he be-
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lieved that they are bound to have a negative influence on deter-
mining the future of young men. However, he failed to raise any 
awareness about the benefits of educating women. With man 
placed at the higher end of the social spectrum, woman, by com-
parison, is conceived as a metonymy for intellectual rigidity in 
society and the nation.   
Al-Husari further masculinises the perception of the nation 
by illuminating the particular education female students should 
receive at schools. Unlike men, according to al-Husari, women 
should receive special teaching of how to manage the household.  
In his own words: “Schools should adapt to the requirements of 
women’s education” (1944: 90). Al-Husari even deemed it nec-
essary to establish special professional schools that catered to 
womanly professions and workshops (1944: 89-90). While al-
Husari presents himself as an advocate of national education, it 
is suggested that female education is confined to the domestic 
sphere. Al-Husari’s proposition for special education for women 
emphasises the national boundaries of the feminine and the mas-
culine. This trend of thought laid the foundation for gendered 
education in Syria, as skills such as cooking, sewing and embroi-
dery later became mandatory subjects for girls in Syrian schools. 
Moreover, the disparity between the wider professional options 
offered to men and women’s confined roles in society (1944: 79-
83) highlights the inferior position assigned to women in that 
national imagining. 
Throughout al-Husari’s theorisation, his legacy in construct-
ing a militarised conception of culture, history and education 
perpetuated hegemonic notions of physical strength. In other 
words, the connection made between militarism and nationalism 
throughout his national ideology appropriated shared solidarity 
premised on masculinity among ‘brothers’ (Ikhwan) of the na-
tion. This masculine construction that was expounded in al-Hu-
sari’s national ideology was later reinforced in the Baʿthist 
ideology, which makes his doctrine essential to understanding 
how the legacy of gender bias in Syria has been ingrained.  
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Michel Aflaq’s Political Philosophy 
The political philosophy of Michel Aflaq has long been studied 
as the most attributive theory towards the establishment of the 
political system in Syria (see El-Attrache, 1973).16 Aflaq’s mil-
itant conception of nationalism is best examined through decon-
structing the national concepts and language in his iconic work 
Fī Sabīl al-Baʿth (Towards the Resurrection). The following ac-
count includes a fine-grained analysis of his public lectures, ar-
ticles, and speeches written between 1930 and 1980. The 
examination of his work will also consider the perceived audi-
ence of his narrative. Accordingly, I will address the questions: 
how did Aflaq seek to position himself in relation to his audi-
ence? And what sort of political community did he wish to con-
stitute? In this sense, this section seeks to provide a systematic 
analysis of Aflaq’s emphasis on the construction of national 
identity, as measured by constructing the ideal image of the 
Baʿthist man (as will later be discussed). More importantly, it 
seeks to illuminate how language is employed to reinforce an 
essentialist conception of women in Aflaq’s national discourse.  
 
Aflaq’s national narrative: men as signifiers of national iden-
tity and group membership 
Contextualising his conception of nationalism, Aflaq’s speeches 
propose the image of manhood as the only representative of the 
ideal human being. This is exemplified in the gender-exclusion-
ary language of one of Aflaq’s earliest articles (predating the es-
tablishment of the Baʿth party), entitled ‘Age of Heroism’ (ʿhd 
al-butula) (1935). Aflaq starts by saying: “Now we close a page 
of weakness from our history and open a new one … A page full 
of patriotism and heroism” (1935). These concepts of patriotism 
and heroism are addressed to “great men”, who will be ready for 
this new battle for the nation. In a more explicit manner, encour-
aging “young men” (shabāb) to join the Baʿth, an article circu-
lated the following year in 1936 distinguishes between 
“revolutionary men” and men who are still out of the party. This 
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distinction does not only refer to the basic Baʿthist ideology as 
“a movement from dark to light” (which is exclusively defined 
by men’s participation in the Ba’th). It is a masculinist call for a 
particular type of men: those who show readiness for sacrifice. 
As the title, “Treasure of Life” (Tharwat al-Ḥayāt) (1936), 
makes very clear, this speech is addressed to men as the only 
ones who give life its meaning, and that through their participa-
tion in the national struggle. Another distinctive feature in the 
ideology of the Baʿth is its reliance on the activism and impul-
sion of young men (indifāʿ al-shabāb17). In a separate article, 
Aflaq states that “between our nation and our men, there is 
chemistry, appointment, and a meeting.” In a more transparent 
articulation of his sentiments, he states that men’s activism and 
impulsion is what our nation needs: “They are the rescuers” 
(1955).  
However, Aflaq has a particular definition of manhood. Ac-
cording to him, there are basic characteristics (ṣifāt asāsiyyah) 
that define men’s national belonging. Aflaq emphasises the spe-
cial rank of the heroic past of the nation, bidding men to identify 
with the glorious past and implement it in their present and fu-
ture. More importantly, Aflaq expects a certain national and 
moral disposition from these men towards their nation (1943). 
Needless to say, that these messages are selectively addressed to 
men, however the definitive characteristics provided by Aflaq 
raise the question of how he conceptualises the sense of belong-
ing and the moral disposition required by these men towards 
their nation (1943). In order to highlight how these features en-
shrine a distinctive internalisation of masculinism in Aflaq’s na-
tional propagation, the following section addresses his 
conceptions of national belonging and solidarity. 
 
Men as cultural producers of the nation: defining national 
love through the construction of manhood 
Aflaq’s contextualization of national belonging emphasises the 
importance of preserving culture and tradition. In his speech 
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“Abstract Thinking” (al-tafkir al-mujarad) (1943a), Aflaq prior-
itises the role of men in preserving the heritage of the nation, 
overlooking women’s contribution to the preservation of Arab 
culture. Aflaq was also concerned with creating an emotional 
basis for the nation, based on the love men have towards the na-
tion. In 1940, he wrote an essay titled ‘Nationalism is love before 
anything else,’ (al-qawmiya hub kabla kul shi’a) in which he 
drew parallels between national and familial love: 
The nationalism which we call for is love before eve-
rything else. It is the very same feeling that binds the 
individual to his family because the fatherland is only 
a large household and the nation is a large family … 
and as love is always found linked to sacrifice, so is 
nationalism. Sacrifice for the sake of the nation leads 
to heroism (1940). 
Notably, these words fuse notions of sacrifice, glory, and mas-
culinity in the national imagination, thereby placing men at the 
helm of the national arena (see  1977).18 However, this proposi-
tion of familial love and belonging has not prevented the exclu-
sion of women from the national imagination. In fact, this sense 
of familial love that binds particularly “brothers” (ikhwan) of the 
nation together in their party, relegated women to the margins of 
national imagining. This primordial construction of national be-
longing in Aflaq’s theory is concerned with understanding its 
two fundamental principles: substitution of family and life.  
Subjective and non-voluntary belonging to the nation is jux-
taposed with familial love (1940), whereby creating familial 
bonds among members is infused with patriarchy and coercion. 
Aflaq’s conceptualization of the nation as a family is intimately 
linked with heroic sacrifices achieved by men. In the course of 
presenting his argument, Aflaq uses the concept of the family as 
a substitute for the nation, which subsequently makes women 
invisible in both the private and public spheres. Such a substitu-
tion ascribes masculine qualities to society and the nation. Sheila 
Katz points out the patriarchal side of Aflaq’s notion of national 
love, and sums up its impact on the masculinisation of the nation:  
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[M]en could become lovers and heroes. Sacrifice … 
entailed shahada, the imperative to die for a family/na-
tion … nationalists interpreted the nation to be a place 
in which (at least certain) men could consider them-
selves at home. Dignity at home would be unassailable 
or, if assailed, defended by brothers. Nationalism be-
came a male affair through masculinised definitions of 
national community, freedom, dignity, economic op-
portunity, and security (2003: 80-81). 
Hence, conceiving the nation as a family, based on those who 
are able to discern themselves as fighters for the nation, capital-
ises on heroism as a prerequisite to inculcate national identity. 
In other words, while the definition of nationalism is demon-
strated only through ‘love’, this love can only be accomplished 
in masculine terms where men are patriots and great soldiers of 
the nation. This in turn marginalises the role of women in the 
construction of the national community.  
 
Reconstruction of heroic past through pain, suffering and 
struggle 
Aflaq’s politics of belonging entail submission to the scheme of 
a solidified life. Aflaq emphasises the image of the nation as a 
community born out of solidarity between patriots. According to 
him, the nation is composed only of those who embody the “na-
tional idea” (1944). The related question in this context is, how 
does the nation preserve its identity? Aflaq encourages a sense 
of belonging among those who internalise the national cause in 
their souls, and are therefore committed to sacrifice and die for 
the nation; those “who are aware of themselves and their indi-
viduality, and not that distorted, abnormal minority who are in 
denial of their national role” (1950). In fact, Aflaq specifies the 
membership of this imagined majority to be exclusively com-
prised of male patriots. This implementation of struggle, sacri-
fice, and suffering, as national themes which are ascribed with 
manhood and masculinity, is central to Aflaq’s definition of na-
tional belonging. Even in the 1940s, by which time Al-Baʿth was 
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established as a political party, the linguistic choices of Aflaq 
were not any more gender-inclusive. In a detailed article on the 
concept of national “Faith” (Īmān)’ (1943c), Aflaq connects the 
concept of “faith” with national consciousness.  He states that 
the value of having ‘faith in the Baʿth’ has been confined to our 
‘Arab men’ (al-shabāb al-ʿarabī). Moreover, this faith is con-
ceptualised as a means to “transcend partition through pain … 
and struggle” (1943c). 
Like al-Husari, Aflaq’s primordial conception enforces a 
non-voluntary belonging on members of the nation. This is clear 
in his article “Nationalism is a self-fulfilling destiny” (al-
Qawmiyyah qadar mujeeb) (1940a): 
Very rarely does a person (marʾ) think of simple ques-
tions like his name and face? They are his destined fea-
tures that are going to stick with him till the rest of his 
life. We belong to nationalism just in the very same 
way that we have our names since we were born, and 
like our facial features that we inherit from our fathers 
and grandfathers. Even though in adulthood we might 
dislike our names and we prefer if we were called other 
names. However, we are obliged to accept our name as 
well as our face because our facial features hold the 
meaning of our inner soul and construct our identity 
even if this face does not represent the perfect beauty 
… Nationalism to people (shaʿb) is like a name and a 
face to an individual, it is a destiny that cannot be 
avoided … So, why one bothers himself in changing 
his destiny while he can fulfil every step in his life with 
patriotism. He should say if this is my destiny, then let 
it be heroic … However, what kind of ‘man’ (rajul) is 
that who does not feel proud about his nationalism 
(1940a). 
Aflaq’s excessive use of masculine terms has ranged from the 
term marʾ (person), which is specified later in the text to include 
men only through the use of rajul ([mature] man). These mascu-
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line terms effectively exclude women from the national imagin-
ing. Moreover, this language choice highlights an inherent para-
dox: while Aflaq’s conception of belonging is naturalistic, he 
constructs a special definition of this belonging, confined to the 
performativity of heroism and manliness. At the same time, 
Aflaq harshly condemns those who do not meet the ideal defini-
tion of man in his ideology:  
Whenever I think about the conditions of such a man, 
I writhe with fear of the image of misery engulfing him 
and the frostbite of isolation keeping him aloof. What 
narrow horizons of his own, a poor soul and a silly, dull 
life! He goes through his life, neither knowing that he 
is a bough of a tree which is deeply rooted in the past 
and whose branches grow up through ages … nor un-
derstanding that he is one among millions who suc-
ceeded each other throughout centuries and 
generations, cultivating lands … and fighting and dy-
ing in wars. They strove for all that to write the history 
of their own nation, line by line, build it up, stone by 
stone, clarify and prove its genius and continue carry-
ing its mission out. All those millions strove, fought, 
wrestled with storms and withstood disasters to lead 
him forth from the darkness of nonexistence into the 
light of life, give birth to him – the unmindful, the for-
getful – enrich his life with the lives of millions, foster 
his actions with the efforts exerted by all generations, 
burden and honour him with the responsibility of the 
past, and let him get a name with which he is called and 
features with which he is distinguished among others, 
so that he is no more a "Zayd" or "Bakr" (John Doe); 
rather, when it is time for every nation to vie in boast-
ing with one another, he can say: "I am Arab” (1940a). 
These words subscribe to a monolithic definition of belonging, 
based on achieving masculine prowess as the normal status quo 
in the nation. The text also presents a clear-cut distinction be-
tween men classified as heroes, and those considered cowards, 
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depending on their readiness to defend and sacrifice for the na-
tion. The key feature of this belonging in Aflaq’s early manifes-
tations of nationalism has been the denial of women’s 
participation in formulating the nation (ibid). Hence, national 
discourse becomes embedded with power relations and hierar-
chy. Such a masculinist construction of national narrative is fur-
ther manifested in the emphasis on reviving the glorious past 
(majd) through appreciative men: 
So cruel is such a destiny as we were destined to live 
in the age of weakness, disgrace, backwardness and di-
vision instead of living in the age al-Walīd or that of 
al-Rashīd when we were backed by a venerated and in-
vincible state, an active and unified people and a 
golden civilization that shone like the sun. Destiny may 
sometimes be cruel, but it is forever and ever just; it 
distributes heroism only according to difficulty and 
gives glory only according to efforts. And, in its view, 
the heroism of those striving nowadays to liberate their 
countries from foreign occupation and the threat of di-
vision and to extract them from the abyss of ignorance 
and poverty is no less than the heroism of Qutaybah 
and Ibn Nuṣayr. As the age of al-Rashīd and al-
Maʾmūn expanded to produce philosophies and litera-
tures, each of today's heroes will similarly be, in the 
view of future generations, a subject of an eternal epic, 
and his sacrifice will be the birth of a new philosophy 
(1940a). 
Not only is Aflaq’s language gender-biased, but his failure 
to recognise what women achieved on the national level in the 
1940s is another dimension of how his embodiment of the past 
is only represented by male fighters. Also essential to construct-
ing the nation is advocating the heroic history: Aflaq insists on 
the role of history in binding the nation together. However, his 
version of Arab history is confined to the heroic deeds of its men. 
This is evident in his invocation of Qutaybah, Ibn Nuṣayr, al-
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Rashīd and al-Maʾmūn as representatives of Arab history 
(1943b; 1950).19 
This emphasis on reviving the heroic past is deeply inter-
twined with the commemoration of the shared experience of 
struggle and pain by the “masses”. By Aflaq’s insistence on re-
alising a dialectical construction of the heroic past, rites of sac-
rifice and struggle tend to bring the past into the present. While 
the use of the “masses” denotes a gender-neutral perception, 
Aflaq cites once more the distinction between active and passive 
men, filtering out women from this national construction (1957). 
Another demonstration of the masculinism of Aflaq’s narrative 
is his conception “young men” (shabāb) and “the people” (al-
shaʿb). This is another reference to how Aflaq conceives the 
“masses” (jamāhīr). Aflaq’s conceptualization of the masses as 
falling into either of two categories—“young men” or “peo-
ple”—leads to a gendered construction of national identity. Even 
within this classification, Aflaq prioritises the role of young men 
in formulating and representing the nation, and bids the people 
(al-shaʿb) to learn from them (1950a). It is not clear where 
women fit into Aflaq’s hierarchal social differentiation. He 
states that this division cannot be avoided as “young men” are 
the ones who present the nation with their sacrifices. The ambi-
guity of the term “young men” (shabāb), along with Aflaq’s 
masculinist-inflected version of patriotism, exudes a masculine 
definition of the nation (1957a). 
Moreover, according to Aflaq, pain and suffering are not 
only connected with the construction of a heroic past, but are 
also conceived as the backbones of the nation. In his article, “Ar-
abism and Pain” )ūrūba wa lʾalam) (1956), Aflaq affirms the 
process defined as “resurrection is through suffering” (ibid). Ar-
abism can be only be realized through “struggle” and “pain”. In 
his own words: “The destiny of our Arabism is suffering.” How-
ever, even these two national conceptions (suffering and strug-
gle) are measured and identified with manliness. Along with 
defining “the great struggle” of the nation, Aflaq contextualised 
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the meaning of struggle through reaching the “perfection of 
manhood’’ (rujūlah) (ibid). 
The trope of sacrifice and struggle continues to structure the 
order of people in the national imagination. Aflaq distinctively 
differentiates between active and passive men. In his theorisa-
tion, he considers sacrifice and struggle the definitive features of 
real Baʿthists. Indeed, the following passage not only illustrates 
Aflaq’s hierarchal categorisation of men in the nation, it even 
associates “humanity” with manhood: 
When activists accept the hard-won struggle and bear 
the sacrifices and agonies … they are aspiring that their 
comrades will follow the road of national struggle in 
order to establish their nation for their people and their 
sons … However, there is an organic link/nexus be-
tween the eras of negative struggle and the eras of pos-
itive struggle. The achievements of positive struggle 
are the production of virtues, steadfastness … and the 
production of deep human experience by which the 
fighter acquires through his experience of struggle and 
adversity … this is what distinguishes him from the 
[passive] others … So struggle is an indivisible unit 
with both its positive and negative halves … Therefore, 
struggle is the true life and I would say its foundation 
is this active part … it is the period when the fighter is 
absorbed and fused with principles, suffering and sac-
rifice … It is the only period by which the identity of 
the fighter is determined alongside his destiny, merit 
and his originality (1967). 
Aflaq’s hierarchal construction of national identity must be un-
derstood in relation to the two dichotomised categorisations of 
men: passive vis-à-vis active. Such categorisation situates 
women in a third category, effectively relegating women in the 
national imagining not only to the private sphere, but to an al-
most invisible sphere.  
Another manifestation of gender-bias in Aflaq’s national 
construction is based on invoking a unified concept of heritage. 
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According to Davis, heritage is transmitted through women (Da-
vis, 1997: 21; see also Peterson, 1998). Aflaq, on the other hand, 
associates national heritage with the great experience of men. 
This masculine characterisation of heritage emphasises a mono-
lithic perception with the appeal to the great deeds of men. Ac-
cording to Aflaq, “understanding heritage can only be through 
revolutionary thought and the suffering of struggle” (1967). In 
this sense, struggle and suffering, the twin sirens of Aflaq's mas-
culinist composition of national narrative, also perpetuate the 
concept of heritage based on those who suffer and struggle for 
the nation. This rhetoric of suffering and struggle is replete with 
images of men as representatives of the nation’s heritage.  
However, in addition to identifying struggle with men’s he-
roic sacrifices, sufferings, and achievements, Aflaq employs 
other meanings of “struggle” (niḍāl) in his national discourse. 
Aflaq’s conception of national struggle has a variety of mean-
ings ranging from the struggle to realise the ultimate goal of man 
through sacrifice, to the daily struggle in life and the struggle for 
education and knowledge (1956a). That is, his conception of 
daily struggle in this context has multiple manifestations in eve-
ryday life (1956a). As such, while he previously associated 
struggle with sacrifice, despite this change of tone, Aflaq still 
excludes women from his conception. He even refers to men as 
munāḍilīn (fighters) of the nation and further warns them that if 
they do not stand up to their role in everyday tasks, their “ruju-
latkum”, manliness, is under threat (1956a). 
Indeed, even the daily struggle for education and 
knowledge is associated exclusively with men’s intellectual ca-
pacity (1970). Aflaq was aware that the Arab nation was entering 
a “new era” that required a great level of “intellectuality” in or-
der to keep up with modernisation and global change. In his 
speech, “The Party of Arab Revolution” (hīzb al-thawrah al-ʿar-
abyyah), delivered in 1970, he redefines the characteristics of the 
“ideal Baʿthist” and the “Baʿthi fighter”. Aflaq’s conception of 
“struggle” (niḍāl), in the early inception of the Baʿth ideology, 
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was associated with militancy, fighting, and using force. How-
ever, during the 1970s, there was a redefinition of “struggle”’ in 
his thought to mean the promotion of the “intellectual founda-
tion” of the Baʿth. The notions of “sacrifice” (taḍḥyyah), “strug-
gle” (nīdāl), and “manhood” (rujūla), which define the ideal 
“Baʿthi fighter”, are substituted with the emphasis on education 
and intellectuality. However, this redefinition of the concept of 
“struggle” to encompass the field of education is still masculinist 
through the emphasis on men’s role in education and the disre-
gard for women’s achievements and the need to educate them 
(see 1974a).20 
 
The army: the ideal construction of the Ba’athist man 
In light of the above analysis, there is a need to illuminate how 
Aflaq understood the Baʿth message, which is defined in his 
speech, “About the Arab Message” (hawl al-risālah al-ʾarabiy-
yah) (1946), as a belief before anything else…it precedes any 
practical knowledge… It is the nation…and it is the right of 
every individual to aspire for chivalry (al-murūʾa) and heroism 
(al-butūla)… However, as should be noticed, although it is re-
quired that each one should aspire for heroism, but not all people 
are heroic (alʾbtāl) (1946). 
While Aflaq’s narrative appears to be inclusive in his refer-
ence to “all individuals” (’afrād) rather than using (shabāb) 
“men”, still the correlation between accomplishing your individ-
uality and your national role in the nation can only be achieved 
through heroism and chivalry and their juxtaposition with the 
construction of masculinity. As (al-murūʾa) “chivalry” in Arabic 
stands for “perfect manhood”,21 Aflaq’s poetic style demon-
strates an essentialist correlation between manliness and the con-
struction of ideal national identity. The construction of this 
companionship manifests in the two words—“heroism and chiv-
alry”—that delineates an apprehension for a masculinist national 
conception. In the same vein, Aflaq introduces a new concept of 
Baʿth, which is its revolutionary character, stressing that what 
society needs most is the revolutionary spirit of its “young men” 
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(1950b). Indeed, Aflaq states that, “in the achievement of man’s 
national identity, the identity of the nation will be achieved. And 
the realisation of his ambitions and dreams will contribute to 
public life’’ (1944). Aflaq insists that the nation comes into ex-
istence through the true embodiment of patriotism in its mem-
bers’ souls.  
This proposition of a revolutionary Baʿthist identity raises 
the question of how Aflaq perceives the Baʿth generation. Suf-
fice to say that Aflaq conditions the realisation of the nation’s 
identity on the masculine traits of heroism, strength, and, more 
importantly, militarism. This identification between the man and 
the nation delineates a gendered nationalist conception. By fos-
tering a stratified, masculinist culture in the national imagina-
tion, Aflaq gratifies the role of army in his narrative. His speech, 
“The Army is Part of the Fighting Masses” (al-jaish hwa jīzʾ min 
al-jamahīr al-monaḍilah) (1974), raises further questions about 
how women are conceptualised within these “fighting masses”. 
In his own words, Aflaq states, “I am here to confirm that the 
Party gives a primary position to the army. In the Baʿthist ideol-
ogy and its theorisation, the army is very important” (1974).  The 
army, then, becomes another place for idealising masculinity by 
epitomising concepts like heroism, bravery, and sacrifice, which 
are recognised as masculine traits. The Baʿth not only affords the 
army an important role, it rather aims to normalise militarism in 
society:  
The Baʿth ideology should take care of those men who 
enter the army for a short period – the period of mili-
tary service only –  and those who remain in civil life; 
we should enforce values of militarism into their lives 
… This is for the upbringing of the new generation, 
whether in the military or in civilian life (1974). 
These words endow the values of militarism with a further di-
mension in society by configuring and extending hierarchy, pa-
triarchy, and bravery. Aflaq’s normalisation of the military ethos 
highlights the hierarchal authority of male domination which 
resonates with enshrining a culture of masculinity. Moreover, 
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Aflaq extends the naturalisation of militarism into the realms of 
civil life. This naturalisation of patriarchal ideologies embedded 
in Aflaq’s theorisation of the army conventionally depends on 
the capacity for male authority, ranging from the militaristic to 
the domestic. Hence, Aflaq’s notion of the army as an ideologi-
cal formation of society determinates the increasingly reciprocal 
relationship between manhood and militarism. It further trans-
mits the authority of men in a public institution – the army – to 
that of the private sphere – the family. 
 
The essentialist perceptions of women in al-Arsuzi’s politi-
cal theory: nature vs culture 
Al-Arsuzi brings us together to praise the introduction of liberal 
thought in his national doctrine. His national thought embraces 
the application of state, democracy and free society, in contrast 
to al-Husari and Aflaq’s chief theorisation of the nation as a cul-
tural and primordial entity. Al-Arsuzi introduces a civic concep-
tion of the nation based on highlighting the importance of 
achieving a political body: the state. His national theorisation 
further emphasises the need to adopt democracy and freedom in 
the process of nation-building. Suffice it to say that such notions 
are the outcome of the deep influence wrought upon him by his 
study of the French Revolution (Choueiri, 2001: 144). This at-
traction to French ideals might be attributed to his excellence in 
speaking French, and to his studying at the Sorbonne University. 
He came back to Syria in 1930 very influenced by the French 
Revolution and its principles. This, however, later caused him 
trouble with the French authorities for teaching the principles of 
French Revolution to his students in Syria. 
The lack of scholarship tackling his work is attributed to the 
limited access to his early and later writings. However, his influ-
ence in the emergence of the Baʿth political system has been re-
considered, after Hafez al-Assad became president in the 1970s 
(Saba’, 2005: 298). This is mainly because ‘Assad needed an 
ideological preacher to further strengthen his rule over Ba’athist 
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supporters, so during ‘Assad’s appointment as the Syrian Re-
gional Commander after the 1963 coup, and as Minister of De-
fence after the 1966 coup, he took al-‘Arsuzi with him to meet 
soldiers and officers in the military. ‘Assad’s interest in al-‘Ar-
suzi enlivened al-‘Arsuzi’s ideological stance, and in return, he 
wrote extensive ideological profiles on ‘Assad in the Ba’ath pe-
riodicals (Saba’ 2005: 270).This shift towards al-Arsuzi’s na-
tional theory is not only important on the political level in the 
Syrian context, but also has massive implications on how women 
are imagined in Syrian society. Widely considered the father of 
the Baʿth ideology in Syria, al-Arsuzi is deemed by Dalal Elamir 
to be the most important leader to introduce the concepts of lib-
eralism and nationalism in the Middle East (2010:66). It is there-
fore important to interrogate the perceptions of women in his 
theory.  
Being an advocate of the civic construction of the nation, in 
which the idea of nation-formation transcends the realisation of 
the cultural identity of the nation, to the establishment of the 
state through means of applying democracy, free elections and 
freedom (1973: 321).22 In light of this civic conception, the sig-
nificance of al-Arsuzi’s political writings lie in his preoccupa-
tion with constructing a theology of free society unprecedented 
by al-Husari and Aflaq. Therefore, the related question is where 
do al-Arsuzi’s primordialistic and civic conceptions situate 
women in relation to the state and society?23 
Al-Arsuzi’s overemphasis on the role of philology in con-
structing the nation, makes the analysis of his national concepts 
and use of language highly important. Taking into consideration 
how he used philology to form his national theory, I shall exam-
ine al-Arsuzi’s perception of women through a deconstruction of 
the language of his national theory, coupled with his insistence 
on state and democracy as the only viable means for constructing 
a national community. In other words, this section aims to ex-
amine the ideas of al-Arsuzi regarding women, particularly in 
relation to their nature, education, and place in the social and 
political order. 
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Emasculating the nation: A-Arsuzi, women, and society 
In pursuit of an egalitarian political society and a constitution of 
freedom and democracy, al-Arsuzi proposes a conflicting per-
ception of the emergence of nation and nationalism.24 While his 
preoccupation with the idea of civic nationalism seemed para-
mount in his national narrative (1973: 47-48, 228-229),25 he 
could not transcend the romanticised idea of the nation. In light 
of such a perception, al-Arsuzi is not different from al-Husari or 
Aflaq in defining the nation as an extension to the family, how-
ever, his views reflect more essentialist and misogynistic views 
on women. While Aflaq and al-Husari disregard the question of 
women in their theorisations, al-Arsuzi devotes a substantial part 
of his writings to what defines a natural woman and a natural 
man. It may well be considered one of his most fundamental 
principles that nature is the source of the structural order in na-
tion and society.  
From the very beginning, al-Arsuzi’s conceptualisation of 
the nation (ummah) takes us to how he perceived the role of the 
mother (umm). His preoccupation with philology—the roots of 
the words—forms the basis of his ideological views on the roles 
of women in state and society. Al-Arsuzi identifies belonging to 
the nation with the naturalistic love born out of the mother-son 
relationship. This justification of national love articulates both a 
cultural and primordialistic26 conception (213). According to al-
Arsuzi, the nation as a cultural entity is sustained by the love of 
its sons. However, perceiving the nation as a fraternity deprives 
women of equal representation in the nation. In this sense, the 
emphasis on the role of grandfathers (ajdād) and sons (abnāʾ) in 
preserving the cultural identity of the nation further complicates 
al-Arsuzi’s perception of women. 
Al-Arsuzi stresses that the nation is based on the “natural 
sympathy among brothers, in the same way that the creation of 
the family is based on affection among kin” (: 247). Following 
Aflaq and al-Husari, al-Arsuzi conceptualises national belong-
ing as preceding any philosophical or theoretical knowledge 
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(341), which means that national love is unconditional and un-
controlled. According to al-Arsuzi, the nation is not only an ex-
tension of the family from “a spiritual perspective”, the 
resemblance between the family and the nation also lies in the 
duties assigned to the ‘brothers’ (ikhwān) of the nation (344). 
This suggests that in both the family and the nation, man is con-
sidered the sovereign, the leader, and the superior. More im-
portantly, this politicisation of the cultural and familial sphere 
warrants an examination of how al-Arsuzi conceives the rela-
tionship between men and women.  
In a separate chapter of his book (The Full Works) ‘Muʾal-
lafāt al-Kāmilah vol2’, titled “Family” {al-Usrah), al-Arsuzi 
outlines the importance of integrating the role of the family in 
the formation of the nation. This is strikingly different from how 
al-Husari and Aflaq conceived the notion of family in their the-
orisations. Al-Arsuzi defines the family as held together by 
bonds of fraternal love. In the course of expressing the role of 
the family, we are reminded of the sexist perceptions appointed 
to men and women by al-Arsuzi:  
The family (usrah) as a unit is based on men and 
women. Man in this natural entity symbolises the ideal 
figure, as he becomes the role model for his sons. The 
mother, overflowing with emotions, fuels her sons with 
emotions. The gentleness of women, and the tendency 
of men to control and show mutual sympathy between 
brothers is what formulates a family environment that 
is full of life. In such an atmosphere, the people are 
trained to carry out public duties … In such an atmos-
phere, the mother blooms with tenderness and mercy, 
and the father practices what he is naturally born into; 
that is his inclination for sovereignty and the admin-
istration of justice … In such an atmosphere, all mem-
bers enjoy freedom, the freedom to tackle the duties 
and problems of life (304). 
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 Al-Arsuzi’s words stress that every sex is assigned a different 
role that is suited to their nature. A closer analysis of the linguis-
tic labels used by al-Arsuzi reveals his masculinist conceptions. 
Al-Arsuzi refers overtly to both men and women, which subse-
quently asserts the prevalent assumptions about the different 
functions of the two sexes. Despite this clear reference to gender, 
it is openly asserted that man is responsible for administering 
justice. This hierarchal and patriarchal understanding of the fam-
ily subsequently incites a hegemonic perception of the nation. 
Al-Arsuzi conceives the nation as an arena that regulates the 
relations between rulers and those who need to be ruled. This 
hierarchal conception is exemplified in his reference to the two 
terms “mother” (umm) and “leader” (imām). On the one hand, 
the mother is deemed by al-Arsuzi not only to be the origin of 
life in the family – in as much as she reproduces the sons of the 
nation – but also to symbolise “the image of the nation.” Yet, al-
Arsuzi emphasises that the “leader”27 is the one who leads and 
rules the nation and the family (333). According to al-Arsuzi, a 
man naturally symbolises sovereignty and justice, while a 
woman is naturally defined by her function in relation to the 
man. In such an argument, al-Arsuzi determines the distinctive 
moral standards of men in applying reason and justice to both 
the private and the public spheres. Nonetheless, qualities such as 
tenderness and submissiveness, which are prescribed to women 
establish a certain emotional superiority. This is evident in the 
justification that such a differentiation of gender roles contrib-
utes to the realisation of freedom. This leads us to question the 
gender-inclusivity of the concept of freedom in al-Arsuzi’s doc-
trine. 
 
Women as producers of national boundaries: curtailing 
women’s choices 
According to al-Arsuzi, the family has a significant role in na-
tion-formation. For this reason he considers the family as a syn-
onym for “humanity”. However, the “evolution of the family 
towards superior humanity” (305) is based on controlling 
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women’s choices of their future husbands In this context, al-Ar-
suzi considers controlling who a woman marries essential for 
formulating a nation of a superior race. In spite of his claim that 
his doctrine is not a racial one, when it comes to a woman’s free-
dom to choose her partner, al-Arsuzi adamantly justifies full 
control over her choices (305). In this sense, while al-Arsuzi 
seems conscious of women’s role as markers of national bound-
aries, this recognition is accompanied by depriving women of 
their freedom of choice.   
One might wonder whether al-Arsuzi’s opposition to 
mixed-race marriages encompassed both men and women. Sig-
nificantly, the overt reference to the ‘danger’ of mixed marriages 
only pertains to women. Given the hierarchal structure of al-Ar-
suzi’s conception of family and the nation, it can be discerned 
that the chastity of the woman is yet another masculinist con-
struction which is used and justified to control women’s choices. 
Using rather racist language, al-Arsuzi articulates his view that 
the child born to such mixed-race marriages is a “disgusting” 
(muqrif) “half-caste” (hajīn) (307). His proposal for the regula-
tion of marriage and breeding reflects the priority of maintaining 
the purity of the race in constituting the natural boundaries of the 
nation.  
Such notions instill aggression and racism in the Syrian and 
Arab national context. Yet beyond this enforced naturalness, al-
Arsuzi furthers his argument in the course of constructing an 
ideal national identity through claiming that any marriage to a 
foreign man will lead to physical and psychological deficiency 
in the crossbred child (305-6). He argues that this child is 
doomed to fail culturally and socially, and even compares him 
to “parasites” (ṭufayliyyāt), in a bid to affirm that this child will 
never be able to be independent or responsible. In the course of 
this argument, the woman is solely regarded as a means for 
breeding a superior race, and that only if married to local men. 
In this sense, it is only logical to presume that al-Arsuzi’s anti-
miscegenetic28 views are the roots of the deprivation from Syrian 
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women of the right to pass citizenship to their children if they 
marry non-Syrians.29  
Such an argument is advocated by al-Arsuzi in pursuit of 
the highest convention of the nation, which is a “pure” family of 
superior race. In his emphasis on the significance of painting the 
ideal “image of the Arab family,” al-Arsuzi resorts to the con-
ceptualisation of the hierarchal order within the family (307). By 
conceiving that the family is natural, al-Arsuzi implies that its 
existence is pivotal for the satisfaction of the man. This is re-
flected in his argument that the man is naturally “superior to the 
woman” in the formation of the family (307). Interestingly, al-
Arsuzi further attributes the superiority of the father in the family 
to the philological source of the term ‘abb’ (father) to be identi-
fied in its pronunciation to the term ‘up’ in English, therefore, he 
concludes that the word ‘father’ in Arabic symbolises ‘highness’ 
(iʿtilāʾ) and ‘eruption’ (haiajān) (308). Al-Arsuzi justifies this 
linguistic association with the superior role of the man in con-
trolling the private sphere. 
On the subject of the function of women, al-Arsuzi identi-
fies the central role of the female as attracting the man to perform 
her function in reproducing sons for the nation. In another chap-
ter titled “Woman” (al-Marʾah), al-Arsuzi subjects women to 
what he claims are natural constraints. Supporting his argument 
with philology again, he claims that the term “sayyid” (master) 
originates from “asad” (lion), highlighting the sovereignty of the 
man. This is also in line with the man’s natural function to be the 
breadwinner of his house. al-Arsuzi even associates the linguis-
tic meaning of the term “sayyid” with the man’s inclination to 
“protect his house.” On the other hand, the woman is inclined by 
her nature to “stay in her sacred (al-muqaddas) home” (311). 
This association between sacredness and the home sustains an 
essentialist conceptualisation of women’s role. Furthermore, the 
potential of the woman is seen in her nature to arouse the man 
sexually, which in turn, secures a well-ordered moral and intel-
lectual life for the man (311-312). This is evidently to be juxta-
posed with how al-Arsuzi examines the philological meaning of 
102    An Exploration of Impact: Hunger, Cartoons & Philosophy 
the term ‘femininity’ (unūthah), associating it with “stillness and 
silence” (sukūn), which in turn symbolises her natural love for 
“stability and settlement” (istiqrār) (311).  
Even though this traditionalist view gives women a national 
function in producing a well-ordered “image of the Arab family” 
(307), regarding the family as a natural and pivotal institution in 
the nation has defined women by their sexual functions. Within 
this context, al-Arsuzi concludes that the woman is defined by 
her role in arousing the man sexually, so that she may fulfil her 
natural function of reproducing sons for the nation (309-310). 
Perceiving the woman as the guardian of chastity and morality 
is reflected in her function to preserve her purity for the man, so 
that society sustains its moral standards. According to al-Arsuzi, 
in such an “historical moment, the woman completes the terms 
of her function … if she helped the man to do his public respon-
sibilities. She would ingrain in him the sense of chivalry and pre-
vent those who represent politics from shabbiness and villainy” 
(312). Al-Arsuzi considers the sexual purity of women the sole 
means of helping male politicians preserve the characteristics of 
manhood. He also insists that women are made for “love” (ḥubb) 
and “docility” (wadāʿah) (308, 311, 310). In accordance with 
such essentialist features assigned to women, men are con-
versely perceived to possess limitless potential. Al-Arsuzi con-
ceptualises women’s functional potentials of “sensuality” that 
would “fire the man and fill in him “imagination”, which subse-
quently would turn the man into an “artist” (fannān) and a “hero” 
(baṭal) (312-3).  
 
Women as transmitters of masculinist culture and traditions 
The Syrian writer of freedom and equality has hardly considered 
man and woman to share the same human values. Nonetheless, 
his notions implicitly undertook the assumptions of the origin of 
inequality between man and woman by the hierarchal categori-
sation of men and women to respectively represent the dichoto-
mised spheres, public and private. By entrenching patriarchal 
privileges, al-Arsuzi argues that the “practical duties of the 
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woman, the responsibilities in which she completes her function 
and accomplishes her identity is through being a housewife. She 
should organise everything about house to make it a perfect 
place for the man to rest after accomplishing his tiring duties in 
the public life” (313). He continues that “the woman does her 
duties through turning the house to a national fireplace where 
children learn about the heritage of grandfathers” (313). It is im-
portant here to note that al-Arsuzi, unlike Aflaq and al-Husari, is 
conscious of the woman’s cultural role in preserving the culture, 
tradition and the heritage of the nation. However, this recogni-
tion is limited to the essentialist perception of women. This is 
evident in his argument that the mother, through using her moth-
erhood instincts, shall ingrain the cultural identity of the gener-
ation without the least focus on how to improve her role to 
extend the confinement of the private sphere. In a more clear 
manner, al-Arsuzi asserts that woman’s happiness is achieved 
through “preserving her feminine nature and cooperating with 
the man to achieve what her nature entails from art and virtue” 
(313). It is very palatable in this context that al-Arsuzi consid-
ered the essential character of woman as determined by being 
the servant of man’s needs, whether in fulfilling his sexual need, 
reproducing the new generation, or easing his tiring days of pub-
lic life. 
 
Are women citizens? 
The interesting thing about al-Arsuzi’s views on women is their 
inherent contradiction. While he extensively defines the woman 
in terms of accomplishing what he claims is her natural function, 
he simultaneously expresses the need for integrating women into 
state affairs (314-6). However, al-Arsuzi’s encouragement of 
women’s participation in the national construction is at odds 
with his emphasis on the functionalist character of women ear-
lier. More importantly, women’s participation in the public 
sphere is conditioned on conforming to al-Arsuzi’s perceptions 
of modern, secular dress. He openly attacked women’s choice to 
don the headscarf (ḥijāb) and considered wearing it a reactionary 
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act (314-315). It later becomes clear that stressing the need for 
women to receive education and participate in public life is 
bound by al-Arsuzi’s ideological motives. His aggressive attack 
on the ḥijāb is no wonder a manipulation of what the large reli-
gious sect of Syrian women believe in (ibid).  
What may appear to be the seeds of liberal views on women 
becomes entirely misogynistic again when al-Arsuzi claims that 
the “ingenious man” (al-ʿabqarī) is rather independent and does 
not need the woman in his life (316). According to al-Arsuzi, 
this ingenious man is superior to both what he calls normal men 
and women who have an average level of intelligence. This hi-
erarchal categorisation of men resonates with both al-Husari and 
Aflaq’s earlier representations, but the relevant point here is that 
al-Arsuzi, even after claiming the need for participation in the 
public sphere by a particular type of women,30 still hardly re-
gards them as intellectuals (316). He further contends that this 
“ingenious man masterfully administers the rules that build the 
national society, whereas the women reproduce sons so that life 
continues’’ (316). These words, which follow al-Arsuzi’s seem-
ingly modernistic views31 on women, again position women as 
inferior to men.  
Another demonstration of al-Arsuzi’s perception of the sub-
ordinate status of women is reflected in his conclusive remarks 
on marriage. In the course of emphasising the superiority of the 
“ingenious man”, he furthers a hierarchal assumption by claim-
ing that this ingenious man is better off not marrying the woman. 
He argues that the ingenious man does not need the woman, as 
his superior nature encompasses the dichotomised characteris-
tics of males and females. However, al-Arsuzi continues to stig-
matise women in stating that “the woman cannot live without the 
man” (316).  
Within this context, it seems that al-Arsuzi fell short of ad-
vocating true equality and freedom for women. It becomes clear 
that al-Arsuzi’s writings on women are covertly concerned with 
men’s preferences rather than women’s social and political 
choices. Thus, even though women are included in al-Arsuzi’s 
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theorisation, their role is restricted in both the private and public 
spheres. At the private level, al-Arsuzi advocates the regulation 
of women’s sexuality and breeding and stresses that her natural 
role is to serve the man. At the public level, he confines his mod-
ernistic views to those women who conform to his ideological 
perceptions. 
Throughout al-Arsuzi’s argument, the nation is conceived 
as a brotherhood. Suffice it to say that al-Arsuzi considers the 
creation of the ideal family central to ingraining national solidar-
ity and sympathy among brothers. Al-Arsuzi is preoccupied with 
constructing an ideal family based on realising the satisfaction 
of the brothers in the nation. This satisfaction is supposed to be 
the responsibility of the woman in the family, wherein her sub-
missive function ensures the fulfilment of the man’s role in the 
public sphere.  
In al-Arsuzi’s liberal notion of the state, and in his concep-
tion of how to rule the state, he affirms that the administration of 
the state is based on cooperation among men. In his own words:  
“Why not the human being (insān) has the right of ruling his 
state, as a citizen (muwāṭin), the cooperation among brothers 
(ikhwān) to practice their right in fighting against despotism…, 
thereby confirming their determination to live” (323). The sig-
nificance of al-Arsuzi’s linguistic choices must not be over-
looked: while the terms “human being” and “citizen” are gender-
neutral, they are paradoxically equated with the masculine term 
“brothers”. This argument cannot be understood in isolation 
from al-Arsuzi’s cultural conception, wherein the democratic 
state can only be achieved through the ‘brothers of the nation’ 
(ikhwān al-ummah) (324). According to al-Arsuzi, this cultural 
construction is realised through reviving the heritage of the na-
tion, but this relies on a monolithic perception, based on com-
memorating the heroic past of fathers and grandfathers (324). 
  
The impact of al-Arsuzi’s Baʿthist perceptions on Hafiz al-
Assad outweighed that of Aflaq due to reasons pertaining to the 
ethnic origin of both (al-Assad and al-Arsuzi) (Seale, 1989:27). 
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Such preferences to al-Arsuzi’s national ideology by al-Assad 
foreground the misogynistic conceptions of women’s potentials 
in both the private and the public spheres. Thus, it does not take 
long for the reader to realise that the inclusion of women in the 
public sphere in al-Arsuzi’s ideology is merely hypothetical. 
For, in order to make a real effort to emancipate women in the 
public sphere, there must be major changes in the way women 
are envisaged as naturally born to serve men’s needs. Women 
become fated to fulfil their functions in the private sphere, which 
in turn become their most defining feature.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the considerable neglect of women’s 
contribution to nation-formation in the early period of the three 
Syrian pioneers, al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi. It has reviewed 
the main currents of Syrian national thought on nation and na-
tionalism in extensive detail, analysing and deconstructing the 
traces of masculinist ideologies in national narrative. The analy-
sis takes into consideration the two phases of the evolution of 
Syrian national ideas: the cultural and the political. While em-
phasising the cultural identity of the nation, the three thinkers 
were concerned with two key notions. The first was conceptual-
ising the nation as a family which in turn naturalised the non-
voluntary belonging to the nation. The paradoxical nature of this 
enforced belonging is that it is measured by masculine qualities. 
In the cultural phase, the correlation between national love 
and familial love perpetuated the construction of a national iden-
tity based on the ethos of enforced militarism and masculinity. 
The configuration of the nation as a familial entity has been con-
sidered by Syrian ideologues as a substitution, which conse-
quently constructs the man as a patriarch in the private sphere 
and a male fighter in the public sphere. More importantly, this 
correlation legitimated the transmission of patriarchy from the 
sphere of the family to that of the public (Wedeen, 1999: 52).  
Although these thinkers articulated this correlation between 
the family and the nation, each of them conceptualised its impact 
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on constructing cultural identity differently. For example, al-Hu-
sari considered the family a marginal institution in the nation. 
His disregard for the private sphere is evidenced by the way he 
perceived language, history and education. He relied on the pub-
lic sphere in ingraining national sentiments and substituted the 
role of family with schools and later the military barracks. In the 
same vein, Aflaq stressed that love for the nation starts in the 
family but disregarded the role of mothers in his theorisation and 
reinforced the construction of physical strength as a definer of 
the nation and the Baʿth. On the other hand, al-Arsuzi took a 
strikingly different approach, extensively considering the family 
a necessary institution in the nation. Yet this conscious inclusion 
of the family in his national doctrine only reinforced the subor-
dinate position of women in both the nation and the family. In 
his inclusion of the question of women in his theory, al-Arsuzi 
justified the subordinate position of women in both state and so-
ciety by objectifying women as men’s own possessions. Al-Ar-
suzi perceived women as sexual objects and servants to the man 
in both the private and the public space. This essentialist view of 
women is in line with the process of normalising militarism and 
masculinity in the Syrian national narrative as expounded by al-
Husari and Aflaq. Moreover, al-Arsuzi’s conscious appreciation 
of the role of mothers as cultural producers incited coercion and 
hegemony over women’s choices.  
The second key notion in the three thinkers’ work is con-
cerned with the construction of a unified conception of history. 
Suffice it to say that this narrative has been saturated with refer-
ences to men. The social construction of memory in these narra-
tives focused on masculinist discourses, through which 
memories are shaped to formulate the imagination of fatherland. 
In fact, this glorification of sacrifice is associated with prototyp-
ing militarised men, thereby accumulating a selective history de-
fined by the heroic deeds of men only.  Hence, the narratives of 
al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi masculinised time by projecting 
men as embodiments of the nation’s glorious past and continuing 
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to project them as having autonomous, revolutionary and infinite 
impacts on nation’s present and future.  
This study has also employed Nira Yuval-Davis’ five iden-
tifications of women’s contribution to nation-building. How-
ever, al-Husari and Aflaq substituted women’s cultural, social 
and political contribution to the nation with considering men to 
be guardians and markers of cultural group membership. Al-Ar-
suzi, on the other hand, included women in his theorisation, but 
with essentialist, sexist views of women’s role. While women 
are conceived as transmitters of traditions and culture, these tra-
ditions are channeled through a masculinist prism to retell the 
ethos and ideals of the heroic deeds of men. 
We have seen that all three thinkers identified the nation as 
a cultural entity and called for preserving the cultural identity of 
the nation. However, both Aflaq and al-Arsuzi sought to con-
struct a civic understanding of the nation through establishing a 
political ideology to governs the state; namely, the Baʿth Party. 
On the one hand, Aflaq constituted heroism, masculinity, and 
militarism as the basis of his political ideology. Moreover, he 
asserted that the construction of the Baʿth Party was synony-
mous with constructing the ideal Baʿthist fighter. Al-Arsuzi, on 
the other hand, introduced concepts of free society and democ-
racy as essential for constructing the national state. He concep-
tualised the “people” as political citizens, but conceived women 
as inferior to men. Although civic notions can be traced in the 
narratives of the two thinkers, they both subscribe to a legacy of 
domination and perpetuation through internalising militarism, 
patriarchy and masculinism in the construction of their national-
ist concepts. 
To this end, having interrogated the early emergence of the 
idea of nation and nationalism in Syria, this study has paved the 
way for reconceptualising the construction of masculinism in na-
tional narrative. Uncovering the dominant national concepts in 
the Syrian context can also reflect how the concepts of citizen-
ship, rights, and responsibilities, are constructed in the Syrian 
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Constitution(s) (Aldoughli, 2016a). Furthermore, this imposi-
tion and normalisation of militarism in the national narrative has 
perpetuated a hierarchy that obstructs the elimination of the gen-
der gap in the Syrian constitution and legislation (ibid). There-
fore, this detailed analysis of the national theories of al-Husari, 
Aflaq and Al-Arsuzi opens the door for future studies to investi-
gate how militarism, belonging, struggle, and history, feature in 
perpetuating gender hierarchy in Syrian public discourse. 
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Endnotes 
1 Henceforth al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi respectively. 
2 For further reading on the evolution of these two diffusionist schools of 
thought: the cultural and civic construction of the nation, see (Aldoughli, 
2016). 
3 For further reading on the importance of investigating the role of national 
narratives in perpetuating masculinism in state policies, see Okin’s study of 
Western national philosophy and the influence of its narrative on different 
countries such as France and UK.  
4 Roy Foster affirms the centrality of ‘narrative’ in constructing ‘nationality’ 
as it evolved over history. He states: ‘The idea of nationality as a narrative is 
becoming a cliché: but it is not a cliché of recent creation, fashionable as it 
has been in the work of various postmodern critics’ (1998: 38). His article is 
a case study of Ireland.  
5 This short article demonstrates the construction of patriarchal militant iden-
tity in the Syrian Constitution(s) as influenced by both the cultural and civic 
nationalist elements that shape Syrian national thought. 
6 This alliance between nationalism and gender bias has been widely consid-
ered by prominent theorists. For further reading see: Claudia Koonz, Mothers 
in the Fatherland (London: Methuen London Ltd, 1988), p. 21; Anne 
McClintock, Imperial Leather (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp.2-6; Victo-
ria De Grazia, How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945 (London, Eng-
land: University of California Press, Ltd.), pp, 2, 5-6; Tamar Mayer, Women 
and the Israeli Occupation: the politics of change (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), pp.1-15; Pateman, Carole, The Sexual Contract (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 1988), p.4; Jennifer Heuer, ‘Gender and Nationalism’, in Na-
tions and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview 1770-1880 (California: 
ABC-CLIO, Inc.), pp. (43-47), 43-58.  
7This forceful belonging is also advocated through emphasising that speaking 
Arabic makes you an Arab. This in turn highlights the broad role of language 
from a definitive cultural means of formulating the nation to a tool for per-
petuating coercion and hierarchy. In his own words: ‘Every Arab-speaking 
people is an Arab people. Every individual belonging to one of these Arabic-
speaking peoples is an Arab. And if he does not recognize this, and if he is 
not proud of his Arabism, then we must look for the reasons that have made 
him take this stand. It may be an expression of ignorance; in that case we 
must teach him the truth. It may spring from an indifference or false con-
sciousness; in that case we must enlighten him and lead him to the right path. 
It may result from extreme egoism; in that case we must limit his egoism. But 
under no circumstances, should we say: "As long as he does not wish to be 
an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his Arabness, then he is not an 
                                                     
 
 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                
Arab." He is an Arab regardless of his own wishes. Whether ignorant, indif-
ferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without conscious-
ness or feeling, and perhaps even without conscience’. (Translation from 
Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph 
to Despair (Princeton and Oxford, 2003), p. 72.  
8 Al-Ḥuṣarī makes a clear distinction between fatherland (watan) and nation 
(ummah): for him the nation (ummah) is ‘a group of people’ whereas the no-
tion of fatherland ‘basically, is a certain geographic land’ (1985a: 23). 
9 The use of the masculine term is taken from al-Ḥuṣarī’s narrative. 
10 Al-Husari defies the ethnic origin of the nation that it is composed of one 
race. For further readings on this see: Aldoughli, 2016. 
11 This is according to Davis (1997) analysis of women’s role   in national 
formation. 
12 This is evidenced in his emphasis on the role public institutions play in 
maintaining the cultural language of the nation. He enlisted some tools to 
preserve language which are through the influence of schools and teachers, 
and the churches and men of religion (1959, 72).  
13 This word is often used in Arabic to refer to young men, presumably from 
the age of 18 to their mid-thirties. 
14 This word is used to refer to men in mature age, between 35-55. 
15 It is worth noting that al-Ḥuṣarī’s notions of education and school recur in 
many of his books, and are even occasionally repeated word-for-word. If an-
ything, this confirms his strong views on the necessity of fostering a specific 
concept of nationhood, grounded first in schools and later in the military bar-
racks. 
16 A thorough study of ‘Aflaq’s political philosophy, it is almost the only 
study to dedicate so much attention to Aflaq’s national concepts, although it 
does not address the question of women. El-Attrache highlights the difficulty 
of conducting research related to the Baʿth party. In his own words: “The 
problems encountered in this research were the unavailability of documental 
materials and the scarcity of published Arabic books on the subject. In Syria, 
it is considered dangerous and often arouses suspicion to go to governmental 
offices and bureaus and ask for documents and papers. After the ill-fated six-
day war of 1967, the Baʿth and Syrian officials have become even more cau-
tious of anyone seeking written materials or asking questions concerning the 
Party and/or the government” (p. vi). 
17 While the term al-shabāb sometimes colloquially used to broadly mean 
youth, however, in the context of Aflaq’s narrative it is addressed to young 
men as it is associated with the readiness to die for the nation and being mil-
itary prepared. 
18 In fact, the notion that national love is on the same level as familial love 
was still dominated ʿaflaq’s thought 37 years later. In a speech delivered in 
the opening of the 11th National Conference in 1977, Aflaq emphasises that 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                
“the party is one family”. He states:  We feel that the sense of one family is 
predominant in the party, and this is very important for our national strug-
gle’’. For full speech, it can be found at: http://albaath.online.fr/VolumeV-
Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-Ch11.htm 
19 For further reading on Aflaq’s masculinist notion of the heroic past see his 
speech delivered on the 5th of April in 1943b (In Memory of the Prophet) in 
which Aflaq glorifies the heroic deeds of grandfathers and argues that remem-
bering the heroic past will shape a heroic future (such as recalling the glorious 
past of Qutaybah and Ibn Nuṣayrand the age of al-Rashīd and al-Maʾmūn). It 
must be noted that this speech excessively uses the term ‘rajul’ (mature man) 
signifying Aflaq’s conception of a national community inclusive of men only:  
http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-
Vol%201-Ch33.htm. See also:(al-baʿth al-ʿarabī īradīt al-hayyat) 1950 at:  
http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-
Vol%201-Ch13.htm. 
20 In another speech delivered later in the 1974a (al-mustaqbal lan yūbna ʾīla 
bi al-ʾīlm wa fī minẓār al-wihīdah al-ʿarabyyah), Aflaq evaluates the signifi-
cance of education for the nation’s future and the realisation of unity. While 
this speech reflects a distancing from militarism compared to Aflaq’s past 
work, his words are still highly masculinist.  
Aflaq salutes the scientific achievements of men and the extent to which these 
achievements will inspire the nation’s future. of the fact that these achieve-
ments are confined only to men, coupled with his reference to scientists as 
‘heroes’ and ‘brothers’ reinforces the association with ‘manhood’. 
At the end of his speech, Aflaq calls for scientific cooperation between Arabs 
in different countries. He directs his message to the ‘Arab human being’. 
While this would seemingly encompass all Arabs irrespectively of sexual 
identity, Aflaq bases cooperation between ‘Arab human beings’ on ‘brotherly 
love’ and ‘brotherhood’: 
‘But I must tell you that I am simply and essentially proud of the Arab human 
being everywhere and of the Arab people who are the origin of tournaments 
and heroes, and that my heart skips with joy whenever I see brothers in dif-
ferent Arab countries who gather in an Arab country where they cooperate in 
a brotherly fashion for one common destiny’ < http://al-
baath.online.fr/VolumeV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-
Ch36.htm> 
21 This translation is according to Almaany translations site: 
http://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-
ar/%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A1%D8%A9/ 
22 The chapter ‘The Emergence of Nationalism in the Modern Ages’ (nushu’ 
al-Qawmiyyah fi al’’usur al-hadiyytha) in Vol II. His proposition of national 
concepts: ‘will’, ‘determination’, ‘state’, ‘consent’ can be traced in pp. 321-
323. Further references to this book will be given in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                
23 For further readings on al-Arsuzi’s primordialistic and civic conceptions of 
the nation, see (Aldoughli, 2016). 
24 By ‘conflictual perceptions’, I mean that al-Arsuzi perceives the nation as 
both a cultural and civic construct. In other words, he argues that the origin 
of the nation is primordial that is an extension of the family, but at the same 
time, he advocates the political establishment of the nation which proposes 
the need to establish a political state. His views transcend both Husari and 
Aflaq and shows a clear influence by the two conflictual schools of thought: 
the Germanic and the French. For further readings on the early emergence of 
the Syrian national thought in the narratives of Husaro, Aflaq and Arsuzi, see 
(Aldoughli, 2016). 
25 Further references to this source will be given in parentheses after the quo-
tation. 
26 The term ‘primordialistic’ means that the origin of the nation is based on 
sharing the same language, history, culture and ethnic origin.  
27 He means the masculine guardian. 
28 The interbreeding of people considered to be of different racial types. 
29 According to the Syrian Nationality Act which was enacted in November 
1969 under decree number 276, just after the ascendance of the Baath regime 
to power. For full read of the Nationality Law, see the link: http://www.ref-
world.org/pdfid/4d81e7b12.pdf 
30 Those who do not wear hijab (headscarf). 
31 By ‘modernistic views’, I mean his civic conceptualisation of the nation. 
Arsuzi’s theorisations encompasses the importance of realising the political 
body of the nation; state. In this sense, he was one step ahead of his contem-
porary peers (Husari and Aflaq). 
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